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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(2) and (5). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard 
of review to an issue of contract interpretation on the book value of stock. 
Standard of Review: Contract interpretation is reviewed for correction of error. 
Jones v. ERA Brokers Consol., 2000 UT61.T] 12, 6 P.3d 1129. 
Preservation of Issue: This contract issue was raised prior to trial (R. 141, 165-68; 
Tr. 1-8); during the trial both by objection and motion for directed verdict (Tr. 256-57, 
264, 907); and in the court of appeals, Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2001 UT App 
226, ffi[ 16, 26, 426 U.A.R. 5 (Slip Opinion, hereafter "Slip Op," in Addendum, hereafter 
"Add," at 1). 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in its application of U.R.Civ.P. 47(r), 
approving the trial court's alteration of the unambiguous jury verdict. 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of a rule of civil procedure is reviewed as a 
matter of law for correction of error. Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 
228, 231 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation of Issue: Enforcement of the jury verdict was raised by objection at 
trial (Tr. 990, 994); by post-trial objection (R. 278, 340); and in the court of appeals (Slip 
Op.atffil7,40). 
3. Whether the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney fees that were not 
apportioned for nonrecoverable fees. 
Standard of Review: Recoverability of attorney fees is a question of law reviewed 
for correction of error. Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation of Issue: Objection to attorney fees was raised by post-trial motion 
(R. 284, 331); and in the court of appeals (Slip Op. at ffij 18, 43). 
IMPORTANT LEGAL PROVISION 
Interpretation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 47(r) is relevant to the second legal 
issue. That provision reads: 
If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected 
by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute between the plaintiff, Roger Eggett ("Eggett"), and 
his former employer, Wasatch Energy Corporation ("Wasatch" or the "Company"), over 
the book value of stock for which Eggett claimed payment upon termination of his 
employment. (R. 1.) Wasatch argued that Eggett agreed to be bound by the book value 
as determined by the Company's independently audited financial statement. However, 
the trial court permitted Eggett to ignore the audited book value and sent the issue to the 
jury with Eggett's "adjustments" for a higher book value. (Slip Op. at ^ 3, 10-11.) 
The jury returned a special verdict, finding a book value j ^ r the entire Company of 
$135,672. (R. 267, Question 5, Add. 23.) Plaintiffs book value was to be determined by 
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multiplying Company book value by Eggett's ownership interest of 36.5 percent. 
However, immediately after reading the verdict answer, the trial judge, Honorable David 
S. Young, sua sponte altered the verdict question to refer only to the book value of 
Eggett's stock. (Tr. 988-95, Add. 30-37.) The court thereafter entered judgment 
awarding Eggett the full $135,672, instead of only his 36.5 percent of that verdict figure. 
(R. 367, Add. 16.) The court also awarded Eggett attorney fees, without reduction for 
nonrecoverable fees. (Supplemental Judgment, unnumbered, R. Vol. II, Add. 19; Slip 
Op. at ^j 12-15.) Wasatch appealed from both judgments. (R. 392, Amended Notice of 
Appeal, unnumbered, R. Vol. II.) The court of appeals affirmed. (Slip Op. at fflf 44-45.) 
This Court granted Wasatch's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Shareholder Agreement on Book Value. 
In 1993, Eggett formed Wasatch to market and distribute natural gas purchased 
from small producers. (Complaint, R. 1-2; Tr. 107-11, 130; Slip Op. at \ 2.) 
On April 13, 1995, Eggett entered into a Shareholders' Agreement ("Agreement") 
with the Company's other two employees, Todd Cusick and Curtis Chisholm. Eggett 
prepared the Agreement and signed it as both a shareholder and officer, on behalf of the 
Company. (Tr. 310; Trial Exhibit, "Exh.," 1, Add. 38, 48.) This Agreement set forth the 
shares of Company stock allotted to each of the three employees, with Eggett as the 
majority shareholder. Paragraph 2 of the Agreement provided that, upon termination of 
employment of any shareholder, the remaining shareholders or corporation would have 
the option to purchase the stock of the terminating shareholder. Paragraph 3 of the 
Agreement set the purchase price for the stock of the terminating shareholder as the 
"Book Value" of the stock. Paragraph 18(d) defined "Book Value" as follows: 
"Book Value" shall mean the consolidated net shareholders' equity of the 
Corporation determined as of the end of each [fiscal year] as certified to by 
the firm of independent public accountants then regularly employed by the 
Corporation . . . . Such determination shall be made on an accrual basis in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and shall be 
binding and conclusive upon the parties to this Agreement. . . . The "Book 
Value" . . . shall be based on audited financial statements. [Add. 46, emp. 
added; Tr. 112-17; Slip Op. at \ 3.] 
B. Termination of Employment. 
Over time, various management disputes developed between Eggett and Wasatch. 
(Tr. 125-32; 170-97, 208-50, 316-40, 388-430, 470-80, 529-33, 756-70.) Unable to 
resolve these disputes, Eggett submitted a letter of resignation, dated April 15, 1997. In 
that letter, Eggett conceded that, "[i]n accordance with the Shareholders' Agreement... I 
am required to sell my shares . . . for the audited Book Value as of June 30, 1997," the 
date of the Company's fiscal year-end audit. (Exh. 3, Add. 85.) In a letter dated April 25, 
1997, Wasatch formally accepted Eggett's resignation. (Exh. 4; Tr. 132-38, 141-42, 895-
96; Slip Op. at ^5.) 
Wasatch subsequently terminated Eggett for cause based on misappropriation of 
funds and excessive compensation. (Exhs. 6, 38, and 7.) By the terms of the 
Shareholders' Agreement, if Eggett was terminated for cause, he would not be entitled to 
"book value" of his stock, but only to "par value." (Agreement, ^ 3.) Wasatch 
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accordingly tendered Eggett a check for the par value of his stock, in the amount of 
$1,217. (Exh. 8.) However, Eggett rejected the offer and filed suit, seeking additional 
compensation and the book value of his stock. (Tr. 146-51, 347-52, 388, 435-54, 470-
505, 509-10, 597-618, 642, 712-14, 723-28, 744-48, 773-86, 845; Complaint, ffi[ 14, 19, 
R. 3-4;SlipOp. atTnfe-8.)1 
C. Trial and Evidence on Book Value. 
On the stock issue, Eggett claimed, and the jury found, that Eggett was not validly 
terminated for cause; therefore, he was entitled to the book value of his stock, which was 
to be determined as of June 30, 1997. (Special Verdict, Questions 3 and 4, R. 267, Add. 
23; Slip Op. at ^ 8, 12.) Wasatch does not challenge either of those jury determinations 
on appeal. The sole focus of this appeal (aside from attorney fees) is the correct book 
value of Eggett 5s stock. 
Eggett alleged in his complaint that the book value of his stock, comprising 36.5 
percent of the Company's shares, was $80,000. (Complaint, f 20, R. 4.) At trial, Eggett 
testified that, to determine his book value, "you take the equity of the company and you 
multiply it by my ownership interest, which was 36.5%, so we have to determine the 
amount of ownership equity that was in the company." (Tr. 256; see also Exh. 26, p. 6, 
1
 On the issue of compensation, Eggett claimed a right to unpaid profit sharing in the amount 
of $66,688. (Exh. 26, p. 5; Tr. 252-55, 894.) Wasatch argued that Eggett was entitled to 
maximum additional income of only $5,700. (Exh. 42, p. 4; Tr. 573, 980.) Finding a figure 
between those extremes, but closer to the Wasatch number, the jury awarded Eggett additional 
compensation of only $11,888. (Special Verdict, Questions 1 and 2, R. 266, Add. 22; Slip Op. at 
\ 12.) Wasatch does not challenge that compensation verdict on appeal. 
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Add. 49.) Both parties relied on that formula throughout the trial. The parties agreed that 
Company stockholder equity ("book value") is determined by adding retained earnings 
and contributed capital. (Tr. 281-82, 570-73.) As set forth in the Company's audited 
financial statement for June 30, 1997, retained earnings equaled $57,703. (Exh. 42, p. 3, 
Add. 56.) That figure added to contributed capital equaled total Company stockholder 
equity of $75,452. (Id.; Tr. 573, 669.) Applying Eggett's formula, that total Company 
equity is multiplied by Eggett's ownership interest of 36.5 percent to derive the book 
value of Eggett's stock at $27,540. (Slip Op. at ffif 9-10.) Based on the Shareholders' 
Agreement, Eggett is conclusively bound by that book value of his stock, as established 
by the independently audited financial statement. 
At trial, however, Eggett sought to increase the book value of his stock by making 
certain "adjustments" to the Company's audited financial statement. He presented 
evidence that retained earnings should be increased by adding three different items he 
claimed the independent auditors had improperly left out: (1) $283,000 for anticipated 
loss on a so-called "swap contract" on which Eggett claimed there was ultimately no loss 
(Tr.266-69); (2) $296,252 for so-called "suspense items," which include uncertain 
earnings held in suspense on Company books until exact amounts can be determined (Tr. 
272-77); and (3) $45,553 for a disputed contract with Gryndberg Energy, on which Eggett 
claimed there was no dispute (Tr. 277-81). These adjustments would increase retained 
earnings from $57,000 to $682,000. (Tr. 891-93; Exh. 26, p. 7, Add. 50.) Eggett added 
that figure to contributed capital to reach total Company stockholder equity of $699,778. 
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(Id., Add. 51.) Multiplying that figure by his ownership interest of 36.5 percent, he fixed 
the book value of his stock at $255,419, nearly ten times the value established by the 
audited financial statement. (Id; Tr. 893-94; Slip Op. at Tf 11.) 
Wasatch's counsel objected to Eggett's adjustments to retained earnings, arguing 
that Eggett was contractually bound by the retained earnings figure in the audited 
financial statement, and that such adjustments violate generally accepted accounting 
principles. (Tr. 256, 264-65.) Eggett presented no expert testimony in support of his 
adjustments to the Company's audited financial statement. In fact, Eggett conceded that 
the Company's audited statement for June 30, 1997 was prepared in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles, and that his retroactive adjustments to increase 
Company equity would be contrary to those principles. (Tr. 890, 290-92.) Further, both 
the Company's chief financial officer and its independent auditor, representing Ernst & 
Young, testified that Eggett's retroactive adjustments to the audited statement were 
unjustified and violated generally accepted accounting principles. (Tr. 570-79, 653-70.) 
Eggett admitted that his book value calculation deviated from the value in the audited 
statement and, therefore, was outside the terms of the Shareholders' Agreement; 
nonetheless, he asked the jury to award him what they considered "fair and just." (Tr. 
313-15.) 
At the close of evidence, Wasatch moved for a directed verdict on the book value 
of Eggett's stock, arguing that Eggett was contractually bound by the definition of book 
value in the Shareholders' Agreement. (Tr. 907, Add. 27.) By that Agreement, the book 
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value established by the independently audited financial statement was "binding and 
conclusive upon the parties." (Add. 43.) However, the trial court denied that motion, 
ruling that to hold Eggett to his Agreement would be "inequitable." (Tr. 908-09, Add. 
28-29; Slip Op. at ^ 25.) The court thus approved Eggett's adjustments to the audited 
statement and submitted the issue of book value to the jury. 
D. Jury Verdict As Rendered and Revised. 
The issue of book value was submitted to the jury in Special Verdict Question 5. 
Eggett made no objection to the form of the question. (Tr. 925-29.) That question, 
following the formula used by both parties during the trial, asked the jury to determine the 
total book value of the Company: "On the date for evaluation of the shares that you 
selected above [June 30, 1997], what was the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy as defined 
by the Shareholders Agreement?" (R. 267, Add. 23.) The clear intent of the parties, 
consistent with the trial formula, was to multiply this Company book value by Eggett's 
ownership interest of 36.5 percent to obtain the book value of Eggett's stock, thus sparing 
the jury the math and avoiding any risk of computational error. 
The jury came back with the answer to Question 5, finding a total Company book 
value of $135,671.96. (Id.) The jury was not asked to make, and did not make, any 
determination as to what amount Eggett should be awarded as the book value of his stock. 
However, after reading the verdict, Judge Young, on his own initiative and without any 
prior objection from Eggett's counsel, rephrased Question 5, stating that it was 
"confusing," that the jury's response was a "mistake," and that the question should be 
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altered to fit the jury's answer. (Tr. 989-90; Add. 31-32.) Over the objections of defense 
counsel, the judge revised Question 5 to ask whether that was the amount owed to Eggett. 
The judge opined that Question 5 was "ambiguous" because "I don't know how they 
would have come up with the book value of that company at 135." (Tr. 990, 993, 995; 
Add. 32, 35, 37.) The judge then asked the jury his revised, confusing, compound 
question whether Eggett was entitled to 36.5 percent of $135,000 or to the full $135,000. 
Prompted by the trial court's expressed view of the question, each juror answered "yes" 
to the judge's question, leaving the judge room to apply his own inference that they 
intended to award the full $135,000. (Tr. 991-93, Add. 33-35; Slip Op. at ffif 12-14.) 
The court subsequently rejected Wasatch's objections to the proposed order, which 
sought that the order conform to the actual verdict (R. 278, 340), and entered Judgment 
for Eggett in the amount of the full $135,671.61. (R. 367-68, Add. 16-17.) The court 
subsequently entered a Supplemental Judgment awarding Eggett costs and attorney fees 
as the prevailing party. (R. Unnumbered item filed April 7, 2000, Add. 19.) Wasatch 
appealed from both judgments. (R. 392, and unnumbered item filed April 13, 2000.) 
The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Eggett was not bound by the definition 
of book value in the Shareholders' Agreement, but could offer adjustments to the audited 
financial statement to increase his book value. (Slip Op. at ^ 19-26.) The court of 
appeals also affirmed alteration of the jury verdict, ruling that it was ambiguous and that 
the district court "could have surmised 'that there [wa]s some patent error.5" {Id. at fflj 
27-40.) Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the award of unapportioned attorney fees 
o 
on the basis that Wasatch supposedly failed to marshal the evidence. (Id. at fflf 41-43.) 
This Court granted Wasatch's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on all three issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central issue here is the correct book value of Eggett's stock. This Court has 
two different figures from which to choose. First is the book value established by the 
Company's audited financial statement. Eggett agreed, by signing the Shareholders' 
Agreement, which he prepared, that he would be bound by this measure of book value. 
Eggett presented no legal or factual basis to avoid enforcement of that stock buyout 
agreement. The court of appeals erred by refusing to enforce that contract. The 
Company's audited financial statement fixed Company book value at $75,452. Eggett's 
36.5 percent share of that book value is $27,540. That is the agreed "Contract Book 
Value." That is the book value that this Court is obligated to enforce as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, if the issue of book value was properly submitted to the jury with 
Eggett's adjustments to Company book value, then his book value should be determined 
by the jury's verdict. In response to Special Verdict Question 5, plainly asking for the 
book value of the Company, the jury provided the figure of $135,672. Eggett's 36.5 
percent share of that book value is $49,520. That is the "Jury Book Value." If the 
contract is not enforced, Wasatch is entitled to have the jury verdict enforced. Question 5 
contains no ambiguity, and Eggett's counsel made no objection to it. The jury verdict 
contains no "patent error" to justify the questioning by Judge Young. Accordingly, Rule 
47(r) has no application to this case. The court of appeals erred in its interpretation and 
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application of Rule 47(r). Judge Young had no authority to express his opinion that the 
verdict was erroneous and to impose his view that Eggett should be awarded the full 
$135,672. That is the "Judge's Book Value." To award that book value would be clear 
legal error, sanctioning judicial incursion into the exclusive province of the jury. 
Finally, the court of appeals erred by affirming the award of attorney fees to Eggett 
on the basis of the marshaling requirement. The attorney fee award is erroneous as a 
matter of law because Eggett failed to apportion his claimed fees between those claims 
that allow recovery of fees and those that do not. Marshaling of evidence applies only to 
challenges of factual findings, not to legal challenges; therefore, the marshaling 
requirement has no application to this case. In addition, if Wasatch prevails on either of 
its arguments on appeal relating to book value of Eggett's stock, Wasatch is entitled to 
fees and costs on appeal, as well as to reduction of Eggett's fees and costs at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE 
THE CONTRACT DEFINITION OF BOOK VALUE BY APPLYING 
THE WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A. Enforcement of the Stock Buy-Uut Agreement 
Courts are required to enforce contracts consistent with the intent of the parties, as 
manifest by the plain terms of the contract. Unambiguous contracts are interpreted as a 
matter of law for correctness, without deference to the lower court. See, e.g., Jones v. 
ERA Brokers Consol, 2000 UT 61, Tf 12, 6 P.3d 1129; Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, 
% 7, 977 P.2d 550. "The plain meaning rule preserves the intent of the parties and 
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protects the contract against judicial revision." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of 
State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). See also Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) (effect must be given to the intent of the parties); Republic 
Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 294 (Utah App. 1994) ("trial court must 
give effect to the intentions of the parties"); Verhoefv. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah 
App. 1987) ("[contracts should be construed so as to give effect to the parties' 
intentions"). A court is not free to disregard or rewrite a contract simply because it may 
produce a result that appears to the court as unfair to one of the parties. E.g., Dalton v. 
Jerico Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) ("it is not for a court to rewrite a 
contract improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the bargain indirectly on 
the basis of supposed equitable principles"); Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 
497, 505 (Utah 1980) ("A court will not. . . make a better contract for the parties than 
they have made for themselves."). 
Moreover, in construing a contract, a court is bound by the plain language of the 
contract. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to alter, augment, or circumvent the terms 
of an unambiguous contract. E.g., Winegar, supra, at 108 (court may consider extrinsic 
evidence only if the contract language is "ambiguous or uncertain"); Ron Case Roofing 
and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 713 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) ("use of 
extrinsic evidence is permitted only if the document appears to incompletely express the 
parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement"). 
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Unambiguous contracts should be enforced as a matter of law. For example, in 
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), the defendant agreed to purchase the 
stock in plaintiffs business for $900,000, with an option to purchase the building. After 
defendant defaulted, plaintiff obtained a jury verdict for an additional $500,000, claiming 
that defendant had agreed to increase the purchase price if the option were not exercised. 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that because the purchase price was clearly stated 
in the contract, with no provision for increasing the purchase price, defendant was 
"entitled to a directed verdict" on the purchase price, and "the question should not have 
been submitted to the jury." Id. at 148. Likewise, in the present case, the Shareholders' 
Agreement contained no provision for increasing the "book value" of stock. Therefore, 
the book value in the audited statement should have been enforced as a matter of law. 
Similarly, in Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991), the 
plaintiff sued for unpaid compensation under a written employment contract. The 
employer claimed that the parties actually intended payment at levels different from what 
was written. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding 
that the employer was bound by the terms of the contract. "Courts are not obligated to 
rewrite contracts entered into by parties dealing at arms' length, to relieve one party from 
a bargain later regretted, simply on supposed equitable principles." Id. at 551. Extrinsic 
evidence of the employer's intent "was inadmissible to vary the terms of the contract." 
Id. at 552. Likewise, in the present case, the court of appeals erred by permitting Eggett 
to augment the audited book value on supposed equitable principles. 
n 
Stock buy-out agreements commonly rely on the "book value" of the stock and are 
also enforced as a matter of law. For example, in Swecker v. Rau, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3301 (D. Pa. 1990), the parties organized a small business and entered into a stock 
purchase agreement by which the company could purchase the stock of a departing 
shareholder at book value. When the departing plaintiff learned the book value of his 
stock, he sued to have his stock valued by another method and sought to introduce other 
evidence of value on the grounds that the term "book value" was ambiguous. Id. at *7. 
The court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that the plaintiff was bound 
by the agreed book value of his stock: 
[T]he agreement adopts the book value contained in the corporation's 
financial statement, as prepared by an independent certified public 
accountant in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
Thus, the clear intent of the parties is ascertainable from the unambiguous 
language of the document itself, and parol evidence is inadmissible. [Id. at 
•7-8.] 
Accordingly, a departing shareholder who has agreed to accept the book value of 
his stock cannot later alter the book value simply because he disagrees with the book 
value calculation. In Crowder Constr. Co. v. Riser, 517 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. App. 1999), the 
defendant employee signed a shareholder agreement providing that, upon termination of 
employment, stock would be sold to the company at the adjusted book value established 
by the audited year-end financial statement. The employee later rejected his stock 
valuation, contending that book value of his shares was too low because company 
auditors had made adjustments for tax liability, uncompleted contracts, and other timing 
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adjustments. The company sued to enforce the agreement, and the court granted 
summary judgment to the company. 
Affirming that judgment on appeal, the Kiser court held that the accountants were 
authorized to "adjust the book value per share to account for several possible 
contingencies related to the Company's bookkeeping practices." Id. at 185. The plaintiff 
argued that the accounting adjustments made stockholder equity artificially low, and that 
the total should be increased for additional inventories and over-depreciation of 
equipment. Id. at 186-87. However, the court rejected those arguments as mere 
differences in accounting judgment. "There is no contention that [the independent 
auditors] failed to follow generally accepted auditing standards in reviewing the 
Company's financial statement." Id. at 188. The court concluded: 
Where the value of a closely held corporation is determined by the 
use of its balance sheet as directed by a "buy-out" agreement, and is 
calculated by the accounting firm normally servicing that corporation in 
accordance with the terms of the "buy-out" agreement, we hold that the 
value determined by that accounting firm is presumptively correct, in the 
absence of mathematical error, evidence of fraud (such as willful 
concealment of assets), or evidence of a failure to follow generally accepted 
accounting practices. [Id. at 189, emp. added.] 
Thus, mere differences in judgment or accepted accounting methods cannot justify 
avoidance of agreed book value. In Area, Inc. v. Stetenfeld, 541 P.2d 755 (Alas. 1975), 
the corporation entered into an agreement with a departing shareholder to purchase the 
shareholder's stock at the book value established by the most recent financial statement. 
The court enforced the agreement over the objection of the corporation that the stock had 
is 
been overvalued. The court reasoned that "book value" has no fixed legal meaning, and 
that different results can be obtained by different methods of calculation. The method 
used was consistent with accepted accounting principles; therefore, the corporation was 
bound by the agreement and could not alter the book value retroactively. Id. at 763-64. 
See also Jones v. Harris, 388 P.2d 539, 542 (Wash. 1964) ("book value" of stock is the 
value established by company financial statements and courts should accept valuations 
reached through accepted accounting practices); Sperco v. M&SD Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 973, *8 (D. 111. 1989) (parties agreed to book value of stock established in 
accordance with accounting principles and court cannot "renegotiate a contract... to 
ensure a more favorable result"). 
B. Application to Present Case. 
Based on the foregoing legal principles, the court of appeals was required to 
enforce the book value of Eggett's stock, without Eggett's adjustments, as a matter of 
law. Because "book value" is unambiguously identified as the standard in the 
Shareholders5 Agreement, and there is no dispute as to the Company book value shown 
by the audited financial statement, Wasatch was entitled to a directed verdict setting 
Eggett's book value at $27,540, the Contract Book Value. That issue should never have 
gone to the jury. See Brown v. Richards, supra, 840 P.2d at 148; Swecker v. Rau, supra, 
at *14 ("the contractual provision . . . is enforceable as a matter of law"). 
The court of appeals erred by approving Eggett's adjusted book value on supposed 
equitable principles. A court is not free to ignore or rewrite a contract to achieve what it 
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perceives as a more equitable result for one party. See, e.g., Webb v. R.O.A. General, 
Inc., supra, 804 P.2d at 551; Dalton v. Jerico Constr. Co., supra, 642 P.2d at 750. The 
purpose of relying on the valuation of independent auditors is to avoid subsequent 
conflict over the parties' own biased valuations. If a party can later simply ignore the 
agreed valuation because of disappointment with the result, then such buy-out agreements 
are rendered meaningless. 
Eggett has presented no valid basis to disregard the Contract Book Value. He 
conceded in his resignation letter, "I am required to sell my shares in the corporation .. . 
for the audited Book Value as of June 30, 1997" (Add. 85, emp. added.) Eggett's 
Complaint also cited and sought to enforce the Shareholders' Agreement, alleging that the 
book value of his shares was $80,000, multiples less than the $255,000 sought at trial. 
(R. 4.) Neither has Eggett alleged that the independent auditors failed to follow generally 
accepted accounting principles. Under questioning by his own counsel, Eggett testified: 
Q . . . You're not claiming that the audit is not prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles? 
A I'm not. [Tr. 890; see also Tr. 573.] 
Nor has Eggett alleged any mathematical error or fraud. Therefore, the audited book 
value is "presumptively correct" and binding as a matter of law. See Crowder Constr. 
Co. v. Kiser, supra, 517 S.E.2d at 189. 
Eggett concedes that accounting principles allow for "a range of reasonable 
answers." (Tr. 891.) Following accepted accounting principles, the auditors excluded the 
swap contract, suspense items, and Gryndberg contract from income because those 
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amounts were too speculative and uncertain as of the statement date. (Tr. 659-70.) 
Eggett simply disagrees with the auditors5 professional judgment, seeking to add those 
items back into retained earnings on the basis of hindsight, actual outcomes after the 
audit date. However, such retroactive adjustments clearly violate accepted accounting 
principles. (Tr. 573-79, 669-70.) As noted above, mere differences in accounting 
judgment between Eggett and the auditors cannot justify disregarding the contract. 
Crowder Constr. Co. v. Kiser, supra, at 188-89; Area, Inc. v. Stetenfeld, supra, 541 P.2d 
at 764. 
The court of appeals also erred by characterizing this contract issue as relating 
solely to admission of evidence and, accordingly, applying an abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review. (Slip Op. at fflf 16, 26.) Wasatch opposed Eggett's adjustments to 
retained earnings as a matter of contract law, on the basis that they were prohibited under 
the terms of the Shareholders5 Agreement, as shown above. In the court of appeals, 
Eggett conceded the terms of the Agreement, but then sought to justify admission of his 
adjustments as evidence of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
court of appeals accepted this ploy and affirmed admission of the adjustments as an 
evidentiary matter without addressing the real issue, which is enforcement of the Contract 
Book Value as a matter of law. 
The court of appeals analysis is faulty for two reasons. First, while Eggett alleged 
breach of good faith and fair dealing, he sought no recovery for that claim at trial (and 
none was obtained). If Eggett believed the Company's accounting practices constituted 
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bad faith, he could have sought a separate recovery for that claim, but he did not. The 
Special Verdict Form is absolutely silent on the subject, referring only to the breach of 
contract claims for unpaid compensation and the book value of his stock. Eggett's 
adjustments were plainly and expressly offered for the purpose of increasing his book 
value, as shown by his own trial exhibits (Add. 49-51), not to obtain a separate recovery 
for breach of good faith. (R. 117; Tr. 10, 255-89, 888-94.) Second, even if the 
adjustments were admissible to prove breach of good faith, the court of appeals was still 
required to enforce the Shareholders' Agreement on the book value of Eggett's stock. 
That is, apart from any proof or claim of bad faith, the book value of Eggett's stock 
should still be limited to $27,540, as a matter of law. The court of appeals, though, 
addressed only the contrived evidentiary issue and overlooked the central legal issue. 
Neither the court of appeals nor the district court has "discretion" to ignore enforcement 
of the Shareholders5 Agreement, regardless of what evidence may be admitted on other 
claims. 
In summary, this Court should enforce the Shareholders5 Agreement by limiting 
Eggett's recovery to the actual book value of his stock, $27,540. 
POINT II: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE 
THE JURY VERDICT, APPROVING ALTERATION OF THE 
UNAMBIGUOUS VERDICT UNDER RULE 47(r). 
Alternatively, if the Contract Book Value is not enforced, then the jury verdict on 
book value ("Jury Book Value") should be enforced. The jury verdict on Company book 
value was $135,672, giving Eggett's stock (36.5 percent) a Jury Book Value of $49,520. 
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However, the court of appeals erroneously applied Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) to affirm the trial 
court's alteration of the verdict question, giving Eggett the entire $135,672 ("Judge's 
Book Value"). 
A. Enforcement of the Jury Verdict 
Under long-standing Utah law, jury verdicts are binding on the parties and the trial 
court, and the court has no discretion to alter a verdict absent obvious error or a motion 
for new trial. E.g., Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass 'n, 470 P.2d 393, 396-97 (Utah 
1970). Once the jury has found the facts and rendered its verdict, the court is required to 
enter judgment on the verdict as rendered. Id.; Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Heckler, 
152 P. 726, 727 (Utah 1915) (trial court erred in refusing to enter judgment on the jury's 
verdict). After the jury's verdict is rendered, "the trial court may make corrections of 
obvious errors or defects therein,. . . [b]ut. . . it is not the trial court's prerogative to 
make findings inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat the effect of the jury's findings." 
First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969) (emp. 
added). Unless some patent error "is clearly shown, the verdict of the jury should stand." 
EFCO Distributing Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615, 617 (Utah 1966). "[T]he court should 
not upset a verdict merely because it may disagree. If it did so, the right of trial by jury 
would be effectively abrogated " Id. at 618. Judicial tampering with a jury verdict 
invades the exclusive province of the jury, blurring the separate roles of judge and jury, 
and effectively denying the right to a jury trial. See Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 
601 (Utah 1983); U.C.A. § 78-21-2 and -3; Utah R. Civ. P. 38(a). 
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Moreover, objections to the form of a special verdict question must be made 
before the question is submitted to and answered by the jury; otherwise, the objection is 
waived. See Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 264, 266-67 (Utah 1957) ("If the defendant felt that 
the questions were so drawn as to confuse the jury, request should have been made to 
clarify the questions. . . ."); Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1289 (Wyo. 1985) 
(party waived alleged error in special verdict form by failing to object prior to submission 
to jury); State ex rel Sam }s Texaco & Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, 842 P.2d 383, 389 (Or. 
1992) (party must object to special verdict form before jury retires or objection is 
waived). 
In the present case, the Special Verdict form was proposed and agreed to by the 
parties. (R. 184, 270.) Moreover, Eggett's counsel inspected and approved the form, 
correcting only a typographical error in Question 3. (Tr. 847-48.) He made no objection 
to Question 5, which asks for the "'book value' of Wasatch Energy." After presenting the 
jury instructions, Judge Young read the entire Special Verdict form to the jury. Again, 
only technical and typographical corrections were made, each of which was initialed by 
Judge Young. (Tr. 925-29; Add. 22-24.) No correction was made to Question 5. Neither 
Eggett's counsel nor Judge Young raised any objection or question regarding the meaning 
or clarity of Question 5; there was no mention or suggestion of any ambiguity. The 
question plainly asked for the "'book value' of Wasatch Energy," to which the parties 
would apply Eggett's ownership percentage to derive Eggett's book value. Because 
Eggett's counsel made no objection to Question 5 before submission to and completion 
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by the jury, any objection of ambiguity was waived. Baker v. Cook, supra, at 266-67; 
Gallagher, supra, at 389. 
Neither does the jury's response to Question 5 contain any "patent" or "obvious" 
error. Responding to the unambiguous question, "[WJhat was the 'book value' of 
Wasatch Energy," the jury's only response was to fill in the blank with a number: 
"$135,671,96." That number alone constituted no patenl error because it was well within 
the range of evidence presented by the parties. Wasatch proved, based on the audited 
financial statement, a total Company book value of $75,452. (Add. 56.) Eggett, with his 
"adjustments," claimed total Company book value of $699,778. (Add. 51.) Accordingly, 
the jury's answer falls between these two numbers, but is closer to the figure in the 
audited financial statement. To provide some perspective by comparison, the jury's 
answer amounts to approximately 19 percent of what Eggett requested, nearly the same 
ratio of demand-to-award as what the jury awarded for unpaid compensation. {See 
footnote 1, supra) Because the jury's answer did not exactly match either party's figure, 
it was evident that the jury had included some portion of one or more of Eggett's 
adjustments, which was the jury's prerogative, given the trial court's denial of a directed 
verdict. However, the jury's answer, on its face, contained absolutely no indication of 
"patent error." 
The court of appeals strains to identify some patent error, but finds none. Citing 
the disparity between the parties' evidence on Company book value, the court speculates 
that "the trial court could have surmised 'that there [was] some patent error in connection 
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with the verdict5 when the jury awarded Eggett $ 135,671.61." (Slip Op. at^j35, emp. 
added, citation omitted.) However, the court of appeals fails to identify any such "patent" 
error. Based on this hypothetical, unidentified error, the court of appeals held that the 
trial court "properly exercised its discretion" to correct the error. (Id. at f^ 40.) However, 
an error that is merely "surmised" ("to imagine or infer on slight grounds") is not "patent" 
("readily visible, obvious, or apparent"). See Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, pp. 851, 
1186 (10th ed. 1993). The entire court of appeals analysis is based on this contradiction 
in terms. Moreover, by the plain terms of Special Verdict Question 5, the jury did not 
"award Eggett" anything; it found the "'book value' of Wasatch Energy." This 
mischaracterization of the question, by itself, reveals the court's flawed understanding of 
the case. The court also relied on erroneous numbers for Company book value, having 
miscalculated the numbers or misunderstood the evidence. As noted above, Wasatch 
proved Company book value of $75,452, nor $133,155; and Eggett claimed an adjusted 
Company book value of $699,778, not $757,452. (See Slip Op. at ffij 33-34; compare 
Add. 56 and 51.) Accordingly, the "patent error" is not in the jury verdict, but in the 
court of appeals analysis. 
Relying on its erroneous calculations, the court of appeals concludes, irrationally, 
that because the jury verdict did not match the parties' figures, but came closest to the 
Wasatch figure, "the possibility that there might have been an error" is increased. (Slip 
Op. at f^ 36, emp. added.) Why the chance for error was increased by a verdict closer to 
Wasatch's figure is not explained. In any event, possible error is not patent error. Every 
verdict contains possible error. If judges were free to inquire into every verdict for 
possible error, no verdict would be safe from judges who simply disagree with the result, 
and the line separating judicial and jury roles would be obliterated. Juries are entitled to a 
wide latitude in awarding damages, and their awards are not required to match with 
mathematical precision the evidence offered by the parties. E.g., EFCO Distributing, 
supra, All P.2d at 618 ("the judgment of the jury should be allowed to swing through a 
wide arc within the limits of how reasonable minds might see the situation"); Bennion v. 
LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083-84 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, a trial 
judge has no prerogative to inquire into the basis of a verdict that is regular on its face 
simply because the judge may disagree with the verdict, consider it too low, or view it as 
unsupported by the evidence. Such review is properly invoked only by motion for new 
trial. See EFCO Distributing, supra, at 618; First Security Bank, supra, 454 P.2d at 889; 
Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric, supra, at 397 (trial court cannot assess sufficiency of the 
evidence unless a motion for new trial asserting insufficiency is presented). 
The court of appeals also offers the implausible explanation that Judge Young was 
so "intimately familiar" with the evidence that he knew, instantly upon seeing the verdict, 
without any calculation or consultation with the jury, that the jury had added Eggett's 
"suspense account" adjustment to the audited book value and then multiplied that total by 
Eggett's ownership percentage to derive the value of Eggett's stock. (Slip Op. at f^ 37.) 
This speculation by the court of appeals overlooks two important facts. First, the question 
did not ask for the value of Eggett's stock; therefore, the judge could not rationally have 
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assumed that the jury had answered a question different from what it was plainly asked. 
Second, the judge made no mention of the "suspense account" adjustment in asserting 
that the answer was a mistake. Rather, his assertion was based on supposed ambiguity in 
the question (Tr. 990, 993) and lack of evidence to support the verdict: "I don't know how 
they would have come up with the book value of that company at 135," (Tr. 995, emp. 
added). Furthermore, even if the numbers used by the jury to reach its verdict do add up 
now, in hindsight, after Eggett's counsel interviewed the jury and announced their 
thought process to the court of appeals, no such calculation or derivation was apparent to 
Judge Young when he read the verdict and immediately told the jury it was a "mistake." 
At that point in time, no "mistake" was possibly apparent. Therefore, Judge Young was 
not justified in altering the question, after the jury had answered it, to suit his own view 
of the evidence.2 
B. Rule 47(r) Does Not Apply Absent Patent Error. 
Rule 47(r), as properly construed and applied, allows for correction of only patent 
error in a jury verdict. By its terms, the rule authorizes correction of a verdict that is 
"informal or insufficient." As used in the rule, "informal" means "defective in form," or 
"not in the usual form"; while "insufficient" is defined as "inadequate for some need, 
purpose, or use." Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2d 689, 692 (Cal. 1955). A verdict is 
2
 In any event, Eggett's assertions regarding jurors' mental processes in reaching their verdict are 
inadmissible and cannot be relied upon to justify alteration of the verdict. See Utah R. Evid. 606(b); 
Gi *oen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983) (evidence that jury was confused or misunderstood 
facts or law is inadmissible); State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1972) (jury's "process of 
reasoning in arriving at a verdict" is inadmissible). 
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"insufficient" only if it does not fully address the issues submitted. Id. at 692-93. This 
definition of "insufficient" was adopted in the leading Utah case of Jorgensen v. 
Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963), which limited its application to "patent error": 
[W]here it is apparent that there is some patent error in connection with the 
verdict, the court may of course call the matter to [the jury's] attention and 
direct them to redeliberate. [Id. at 935, emp. added.] 
Based on this standard, Jorgensen approved the trial court's questioning of a general 
damage verdict in the "odd amount" of $1,131.51, which appeared to be an improper 
quotient verdict because general damages are typically stated in round numbers. The jury 
reconsidered and returned with a corrected verdict of $1,200. Id. 
Subsequent cases have similarly limited application of Rule 47(r) to patent error in 
a verdict. For example, in Brown v. Johnson, All P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), the judge 
instructed the jury that special damages could not exceed $377.50, but the verdict 
awarded special damages of $10,000. The court advised the jury that "there appears on 
the face of [the verdict] an obvious error in view of the instructions." Id. at 945. This 
Court upheld correction of the error as "undoubtedly induced by failure on the part of the 
jury to understand the difference between the terms 'general damage' and 'special 
damage.'" Id. at 945. Similarly, in Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 
1211 (Utah 1971), a personal injury case, the. court held that the verdict was "insufficient" 
because it manifestly failed to include amounts for pain and suffering and lost wages. Id. 
at 1214. The court distinguished between an "insufficient or informal verdict," which can 
be corrected pursuant to Rule 47(r), and "a verdict regular on its face, which awards 
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inadequate damages," that can be challenged only by motion for new trial. Id. at 1215 
(emp. added). See also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, ^ 41, 977 
P.2d 508 ("An informal or insufficient verdict under Rule 47(r) relates to the form of the 
verdict, not the sufficiency of the evidence supporting it. . . ."). 
A review of the verdict in this case reveals no insufficiency or patent error, as 
defined by the case law. Special Verdict Question 5 plainly asks for the '"book value5 of 
Wasatch Energy"; it does not ask for Eggett's book value. That was to be calculated later 
by the parties. The jury's answer is not ambiguous, as it consists of a single number 
written in the blank space. The number provided, "$135,671.96," is not patently 
erroneous because, as shown above, it falls within the range of evidence produced by the 
parties and is consistent with the demand-to-award ratio of the compensation award, the 
derivation of which neither the parties nor the judge understood, but which they all 
accepted. (Tr. 995.) 
Judge Young's real concern was that the jury's determination of Company book 
value was too low under his view of the evidence. After reading the verdict, the judge 
immediately asked a revised question, "[I]s this the value that the jury believes should be 
paid for the shares?" (Tr. 989.) That is plainly not what Question 5 asked. The jury 
foreman responded consistent with the verdict form, "We believe that to be the book 
value." (Id. at 990.) Judge Young persisted. After asserting that Question 5 was 
"confusing" and the verdict a "mistake," Judge Young again rephrased the question: "Is 
this the value that you think the corporation owes to Mr. Eggett to purchase his shares?" 
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(Id.) Again, that is plainly contrary to the verdict question. Following objections, the 
judge again rephrased his question, this time in a compound format asking whether Eggett 
was entitled to $135,671.96 or to 36 percent of that figure. (Id. at 992.) Following the 
judge's stated opinion and persistence, the jurors simply responded, "Yes." (Id. at 992-
93.) The judge then expressed his understanding that Eggett should receive the full 
$135,671.96 and discharged the jury (Id. at 993.) In response to subsequent objections, 
Judge Young explained that the verdict was "inconsistent" with the evidence: "I don't 
know how they would have come up with the book value of that company at 135." (Id. at 
935.)3 
Thus, Judge Young altered the verdict question, after it was answered, not because 
of patent error, but because he did not consider the answer to be supported by his view of 
the evidence. In the absence of patent error, Judge Young had no authority or discretion 
to alter the verdict question pursuant to Rule 47(r), and without a motion for new trial, he 
had no right to make his own assessment of the evidence. See, e.g., EFCO Distributing, 
3
 Contrary to the assertion of the court of appeals (Slip Op. at ^  14), this procedure was not a 
"polling" of the jury in the accepted sense of asking the jurors if the written verdict is their 
verdict. See Rule 47(q). Rather, this was a blatant attempt by the trial court to control the 
verdict by altering the clear verdict question. Through his misleading compound question, Judge 
Young coerced the jury to accept and follow his view of the evidence, or at least created enough 
uncertainty to allow his own inference of jury intent to supplant the true verdict. Thus, the judge 
plainly failed to act "properly and discreetly in handling the situation." See Jorgensen v. 
Gonzales, supra, 383 P.2d at 936. See also 9 Moore's Federal Practice § 49.1 l[3][b] (3d ed. 
2000) (acknowledging the preeminent position of the trial judge and how easily the judge's 
comments and demeanor can improperly influence or coerce the jury to reconsider its verdict). 
This Court has previously reprimanded Judge Young for similar misconduct in criticizing 
or questioning jury verdicts. (Add. 81.) 
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Inc. v. Perrin, supra, All P.2d at 618 ("the court should not upset a verdict merely 
because it may disagree"); First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., supra, 454 P.2d 
at 889 (the court may not make findings inconsistent with the jury's findings); Langton v. 
International Transport, Inc., supra, 491 P.2d at 1215 (verdict awarding inadequate 
damages can be challenged only by motion for new trial); Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric 
Ass % supra, 470 P.2d at 397 (court has no right to assess the sufficiency of evidence in 
the absence of a motion raising the issue). See also Goddardv. Hickman, 685 P.2d 5305 
532 (Utah 1984) (a trial judge's "mere disagreement [with a verdict] is not sufficient 
reason to order a new trial"). The court of appeals completely misapplied Rule 47(r) by 
condoning, and even commending, Judge Young's interference with the jury's verdict. If 
this precedent is upheld, no jury verdict is safe from a judge who simply disagrees with 
the result.4 
In summary, Rule 47(r) has no application to this case because the verdict contains 
no patent error. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in applying Rule 47(r) to affirm 
Judge Young's alteration of the jury verdict. If the Contract Book Value is not enforced, 
then certainly the Jury Book Value should be enforced. 
4
 The federal cases cited by the court of appeals do not support its conclusion. To begin with, 
there is no federal analogue to our Rule 47(r). The case of Romano v. U-Haul Int% 233 F.3d 655 
(1st Cir. 2000), dealing with a verdict for "nominal damages" of $15,000, is a case of true patent 
error, while the present case is not. The case of Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 108 
F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1997), is distinguishable because the plaintiff there requested resubmission 
of the verdict, while Eggett did not. Here, the trial judge acted on his own, without any motion 
or objection invoking his assessment of the verdict. 
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POINT III: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPROVING 
UNAPPORTIONED ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE PRETEXT OF 
A FAILED MARSHALING REQUIREMENT. 
A. Fees At Trial. 
Attorney fees may be awarded only if authorized by contract or statute. If based 
on contract, fees can be awarded only in accordance with the terms of the contract. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 9855 988 (Utah 1988). A party requesting attorney fees 
must "distinguish between work done that was subject to a fee award and work that was 
not." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, the 
claimant's supporting affidavit must apportion fees between successful claims for which 
fees may be recovered and claims for which fees cannot be recovered. Id. at 269-70. See 
also Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). Moreover, the trial court must 
document its award of fees with sufficiently detailed findings to support the allocation 
and award. Id.; see also Miller v. Martineau & Co., 1999 UT App 216, ^ 45-48, 983 
P.2d 1107; Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1393-94 (Utah App. 1994) (denying fees 
because most related to claims for which fees were not recoverable). 
In this case, Eggett claims entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 19(c) 
of the Shareholders5 Agreement: "In the event any legal action is required by a party to 
this Agreement to enforce the provisions of same, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
recover its costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys5 fees.55 (Add. 47.) However, 
Eggett 5s Complaint contains two major, separable claims: one for breach of the 
Employment Agreement by failing to pay due compensation, and one for breach of the 
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Shareholders' Agreement by failing to pay book value for Eggett's stock. (R. 1-5.) 
Accordingly, only the fees pertaining to the stock claim are recoverable by contract; fees 
related to the compensation claim are not recoverable. 
The plaintiffs supporting affidavit makes no attempt to apportion fees between the 
stock claim and the compensation claim. (R. 287, Add. 65.) The affidavit merely makes 
the conclusory assertion that the stock and compensation claims are "inextricably 
intertwined" and that Eggett should be awarded fees for both claims. (Para. 10.) 
However, that assertion is unsupported by the record. The stock claim is based on the 
Shareholders' Agreement and turns on whether Eggett was terminated for cause and, if 
not, the proper determination of book value. (Tr. 152-69,255-89.) The compensation 
claim turns on the existence and terms of a separate, written compensation agreement. 
(Tr. 170-255.) Accordingly, the claims are easily separable and were handled separately 
throughout discovery and trial, with clear demarcation in the questioning of witnesses on 
the two subjects at trial. (Eggett, Tr. 255; Keith Painter, Tr. 435; Curtis Chisholm, Tr. 
542; Brian Watts, Tr. 607-08.) The two claims involved separate evidence and separate 
calculations of damages. (Tr. 254-55, 281-82, 893-94.) Because Eggett failed to 
apportion the fees for these separable claims, the attorney fee award must be set aside. 
See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998) ("trial court.. . may not 
award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to separate 
claims"). 
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The Supplemental Judgment, awarding Eggett over $60,000 in attorney fees, 
contains entirely inadequate, and even misleading, findings to support the award. For 
example, the Supplemental Judgment recites that Eggett "has made a proper and 
reasonable segregation between those claims to which he is entitled to an award of costs, 
expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to such an award." (Page 
2.) However, as noted above, the supporting affidavit makes no apportionment at all for 
recoverable and nonrecoverable fees. After stating that a proper segregation has been 
made, the judgment recites that all claims asserted are "so intertwined . . . that it is not 
possible to segregate or to distinguish them." (Id., emp. added.) Because the fee 
judgment is purely conclusory, without adequate findings, it must be set aside. See, e.g., 
Miller v. Martineau, supra, at 1116-17. 
The court of appeals refused to address the merits of this argument, relying on the 
pretext that Wasatch had failed to marshal the evidence in support of the fee award. 
Specifically, the court asserted that Wasatch had failed to provide the transcript and order 
from the attorney fee hearing. (Slip Op. at ^ 41.) However, the court of appeals is in 
error, both as to the law and the record. 
Wasatch is not challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support the attorney fee 
award; rather, it asserts that no award is permissible without the required apportionment 
in Eggett's supporting affidavit. This is a legal, not a factual, challenge. Accordingly, the 
marshaling requirement does not even apply. See, e.g., Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^ 17 
n. 4, 994 P.2d 193 ("marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual 
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findings, not to conclusions of law"). Furthermore, the transcript of the hearing, which 
included no testimony, is not necessary to show that Eggett failed to apportion his 
attorney fees. That failure is evident from Eggett's attorney fee affidavits, which are not 
only in the record, but were attached to Wasatch's opening brief, as was the Supplemental 
Judgment for attorney fees. (Add. 19,65.) It is evident that the court of appeals was 
simply searching for a quick and easy way around the argument, instead of addressing it 
directly, as a court is expected to do. The court's treatment of this issue thus deviates 
from the law and practice of prior cases. 
B. Fees On Appeal. 
To the extent Wasatch prevails on this appeal, it is entitled to recovery of its 
attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal, as well as to reduction of fees and costs 
awarded Eggett at trial. See, e.g., Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, 
978P.2d470,479. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. The court of appeals opinion reads more like a deferential defense of a judicial 
colleague than an objective review of legal issues. Contrary to the standard of review 
applied by the court of appeals, a trial judge has no discretion to ignore an unambiguous 
contract or to alter an unambiguous jury verdict. This precedent, if allowed to stand, 
invites no end to judicial mischief, blurring the proper roles of judge and jury. The court 
of appeals opinion perpetuates an injustice and approves unwarranted deviations from 
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existing law and procedure. Accordingly, this Court should enter judgment for the 
Contract Book Value of $27,540 or, alternatively, for the Jury Book Value of $49,520. In 
addition, the Court should vacate the award of attorney fees and costs at trial and award 
Wasatch attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this "T day of January, 2002. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By: ^<^f^^^<^ ^^i^^f^K 
Eric C. Olson 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner 
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THORNE, Judge: 
%1 Defendant Wasatch Energy Corporation (Wasatch) appeals from 
a final judgment awarding plaintiff Roger K. Eggett, Jr. (Eggett) 
$147,559.96 and attorney fees. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 In 1993, Eggett formed Wasatch to market and distribute 
natural gas, as well as to purchase, pool, and resell natural gas 
from producers too small to efficiently do so themselves. On 
April 13, 1995, Eggett entered into a Shareholder Agreement with 
two Wasatch employees, Todd Cusick (Cusick) and Curtis Chisholm 
(Chisholm). The Shareholder Agreement identified Eggett as 
Wasatch's president. The Shareholder Agreement also set forth 
each shareholder's allotted shares of Wasatch stock. 
H3 The terms of the Shareholder Agreement, specifically, 
paragraph no. 2, provided that should a shareholder separate from 
the corporation, the remaining shareholders would have the option 
to purchase that shareholder's corporate stock. The remaining 
shareholders, as per the Shareholder Agreement, would either 
purchase the stock for "book value," if the separating 
shareholder voluntarily left the corporation, or for "par value" 
if the shareholder was terminated for cause. The Shareholder 
Agreement defined "book value" as the shareholder's net equity in 
the corporation, which would be determined by Wasatch's certified 
year-end financial statements. The Shareholder Agreement defined 
"par value" as the original price the shareholder paid for the 
stock. 
^4 In April 1995, Wasatch teamed with Magna Energy 
International (MEI) to expand Wasatch's business. At MEI's 
urging, two MEI representatives joined Wasatch's Board of 
Directors (the Board), which was formerly comprised of Eggett, 
Cusick, and Chisholm. Eggett, as Wasatch's president, retained 
personal control over operating expenditures, but a four-fifths 
majority of the Board was required to approve payroll, debt, 
and/or equity decisions. 
1[5 In April 1997, Eggett tendered his resignation to the Board, 
effective July 14, 1997. Eggett's decision to resign was 
prompted by a series of disputes with Wasatch concerning the 
corporation's management structure, financial decisions, and 
Eggett's salary. As per the Shareholder Agreement, Eggett 
offered his corporate stock to the remaining shareholders "for 
the audited [b]ook [v]alue as of June 30, 1997," the date of 
Wasatch's fiscal year-end audit. 
^6 On May 1, 1997, after Eggett had tendered his resignation, 
Wasatch changed Eggett's employment status to a consultant. 
Wasatch also began conducting an audit of corporate accounts, 
including Eggett's expense account. The auditors, as evidenced 
in their report, concluded that Eggett had taken unauthorized 
compensation and reimbursements for personal expenses. 
\l On May 16, 1997, Wasatch tex'minated Eggett for cause. 
Subsequently, as per the Shareholder Agreement, Wasatch tendered 
Eggett a check for the par value of his corporate stock, totaling 
$1,217. Eggett refused the tender, and Wasatch cancelled 
Eggett's corporate shares on its books. 
H8 On September 9, 1997, Eggett brought suit against Wasatch 
for (1) breach of his Employment Agreement with Wasatch, (2) 
breach of the Shareholder Agreement, and (3) breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In his complaint, 
Eggett sought compensation from Wasatch through his resignation 
date of July 14, 1997. Eggett also sought the book value for his 
shares of corporate stock, alleging that his for cause 
termination by Wasatch was a "sham." In response, Wasatch 
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counterclaimed, alleging the following: (1) breach of fiduciary 
duties, (2) breach of the Employment Agreement, and (3) 
conversion of corporate assets. 
^9 At trial, Eggett testified that to determine the book value 
of his stock shares, "you take the equity of the company and you 
multiply it by my ownership interest which was 3 6.5%, so we have 
to determine the amount of ownership equity that was in the 
company." The parties agreed that determining stockholder equity 
would be accomplished by adding Wasatch's retained earnings to 
the stockholders' capital contribution. 
^10 Wasatch argued that its retained earnings, according to 
Wasatch's audited financial statements for June 30, 1S57, totaled 
$57,703. When its retained earnings were added to the 
stockholders' capital contributions, the ownership equity totaled 
$75,452. Multiplying that figure by 3 6.5%, Wasatch argued that 
the book value of Eggett's shares was $27,540. 
Ull Eggett, however, argued that Wasatch's June 30, 1997 
retained earnings should be adjusted to include the following: 
(1) $618,000 from a litigation "reserve fund" for a lawsuit 
involving United Utilities; (2) a $283,000 reserve for 
anticipated losses on a "swap contract," which did not occur; (3) 
$296,252 for "suspense items," which included uncertain earnings 
or credits held in suspense on Wasatch's books; and (4) $45,533 
for a disputed purchase contract with Grynberg Energy. 
Ultimately, Eggett withdrew his claim to the $618,000 litigation 
reserve, resulting in a claimed total retained earnings of 
$682,000. That figure coupled with the stockholders' capital 
contributions, brought the claimed book value of Eggett's shares 
of corporate stock to $255,419. 
Hl2 On November 10, 1999, the matter was submitted to a jury. 
Following deliberations, the jury awarded Eggett $11,888.35 for 
"additional compensation . . . for the period from January 1, 
1997, through May 1, 1997, and $135,671.61, as book value for his 
shares of stock in Wasatch."1 Prior to discharging the jury and 
final entry of the judgment, the trial court had the following 
exchange with the jury foreperson concerning the book value of 
Eggett's shares of Wasatch stock: 
The Court: Question 5. On the date for 
evaluation of the shares you selected above, 
what was the book value of Wasatch . . . as 
1. Following a hearing on attorney fees, the trial court awarded 
Eggett nearly $60,000 in attorney fees in addition to the jury 
award. 
defined by the shareholders agreement? That, 
the answer is $135,671.61. 
The Court: Do I understand, Mr Robertson 
[jury foreperson], that the jury's decision, 
as I've read this question number, is this 
the value that the jury believes should be 
paid for the shares? 
Mr. Robertson: We believe that to be the 
book value. 
The Court: And so-
Mr. Robertson: Paid for the shares. 
The Court: So, from the, I think the 
question was confusing and that's why I 
wanted to ask that question. The book value 
would be the value from which--yes, did you 
have a question? 
Mr. Stevens (Wasatch's counsel): It seems 
rather inappropriate to be coming up with 
questions for the jury at this time. The 
question is as it's stated and it's answered 
as it's answered. 
The Court: Well, I'm not going to allow that 
to stand if it is a mistake. Sof if I can 
find that out now, I will find that out now. 
The Court: What you're saying by that, let 
me just be sure that I understand what we're 
talking about. Is this the value that you 
think [Wasatch] owes to Mr. Eggett to 
purchase his shares? 
Mr. Robertson: Yes 
The Court: All right. Now I'm going to ask 
that question of all of you as jurors if you 
concur in that determination. Let me go 
through. 
The Court: Do either of you [the parties' 
attorneys] desire that I poll the jury on any 
other questions? 
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Kl3 Following the trial court's final question, Wasatch's 
counsel requested a sidebar wherein the following colloquy 
occurred: 
Mr. Stevens: Your Honor, the way this 
question is worded and the way this has been 
argued has been entirely talked about, at 
least from our point of view, (inaudible) 
book value of the company is. We know that 
. . . Eggett has 36.5%. That's the number 
that should be applied here. To have them 
now-
The Court: Okay, I'm not going to allow that 
and you can make a record of it but I'm not 
going to allow it. I don't believe it's 
consistent with their desire. 
Mr. Stevens: And it's certainly not 
consistent with what they've just said. 
The Court: That's exactly right and so-
we'll make a record of it and that's just 
fine. 
Ul4 Upon completion of the sidebar, the trial judge continued 
with his questioning of the jury, 
The Court: Okay. I'm going to poll the jury 
on particularly question number 5. The 
question, here's the problem and I want to 
just explain it to the jury so that I get a 
clear understanding of what your decision is. 
We know from the facts of this case that 
. . . Eggett owns 3 6.5%. If I interpret your 
answer no this question to be $135,000 for 
book value. That would mean that he would be 
entitled to 36.5% of $135,000.00. If I 
understand it the way I have now asked you 
the question, he is entitled to $135,671.61 
which is a number that you have come to by 
some calculation method for the purchase of 
his shares of stock. So, in other words, 
this figure, $135,000, is a representative 
smaller figure due to him which represents 36 
percent of X which is the larger number. All 
right? 
Now, I want to be sure that I understand that 
correctly and if any of you disagree with 
that, I want to know that. 
The court then polled the jury, all of whom agreed with the trial 
court's interpretation of question no. 5. The court then 
concluded: 
The Court: All right. Okay, I'm going to 
enter, well, we have the record and we have 
indicated on the record what my understanding 
is. This question [number 5], I find, is 
ambiguous in its right and the way it was 
written and that the jury was [sic] spoken 
that the value is due to . . . Eggett is for 
lost compensation, $11,888.00 and for his 
shares of stock, $135,671.61. That means 
that from this decision of the jury that 
those two numbers combined would . . . 
$147,559.96. 
Ul5 Following the completion of the trial, based upon affidavit, 
the trial court awarded Eggett attorney fees. This appeal 
followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Hl6 Wasatch argues the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic 
evidence to supplement the Shareholder Agreement, concerning 
Wasatch's retained earnings for June 30, 1997. When reviewing a 
trial court's decision to admit evidence we seek to determine 
whether the trial court exceeded its permitted range of 
discretion. See Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's 
Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(stating "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the above evidence"). 
Kl7 Next, Wasatch argues the trial court erred by clarifying 
special verdict question no. 5 and the jury's response to that 
question. When reviewing a trial court's decision to clarify a 
jury verdict we seek to determine whether the trial court 
exceeded its permitted range of discretion. See Jorgensen v. 
Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 332-33, 383 P.2d 934, 935-36 (1963) 
(stating the trial court acted within "its prerogative" by 
"question [ing] the jury foreman about the possibility of a 
quotient or chance verdict"); see also Romano v. U-Haul Intf1. 
233 F.3d 655, 671 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating "[t]he standard of 
review for a determination of resubmission of special verdict 
questions is for abuse of discretion"); Unit Drilling Co. v. 
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Enron Oil & Gas Co., 108 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(stating "it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
refuse to ask the jury to clarify its verdict"); Newcomber v. 
Weyerhaeuser Co., 614 P.2d 705, 708 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) 
(stating " [a] trial court is empowered to make such inquiry of 
the jury as is necessary to clear up a misunderstanding without 
first sending the entire case back for consideration" (emphasis 
added)). 
^18 Finally, Wasatch argues the trial court erred by awarding 
Eggett attorney fees because Eggett's counsel did not properly 
apportion out his nonrecoverable fees, and the trial court failed 
to support its ruling with supporting findings of fact. We do 
not reach the merits of this portion of Wasatch's claim because 
Wasatch has failed to satisfy the marshaling of evidence 
requirement. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12,1(24, 973 P.2d 431 
(stating "[w]hen an appellant fails to meet the 'heavy burden' of 
marshaling the evidence, . . . we 'assume [] the record supports 
the findings of the trial court'" (citation omitted)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Admissibility of Adjustments to Wasatch's 
June 30, 1997 Retained Earnings 
Hl9 Wasatch argues that the adjustments to the certified year-
end audit determining Wasatch's retained earnings for June 30, 
1997, are extrinsic evidence used by Eggett to vary the 
unambiguous terms of the Shareholder Agreement to establish the 
book value of the corporate stock.2 Accordingly, Wasatch argues 
that the trial court erred in admitting that evidence, because 
extrinsic evidence may not be used to supplement or alter the 
terms of an unambiguous contract. 
[^2 0 Although we agree with Wasatch that extrinsic evidence is 
not generally admissible to vary the terms of an otherwise 
unambiguous contract, see Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer 
Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995), we find no reason 
why this otherwise relevant evidence3 may not be offered in 
2. The Shareholder Agreement states that "'Book Value' shall 
mean the consolidated net shareholders' equity of the Corporation 
determined as of the end of each [fiscal year] as certified to by 
the firm of independent public accountants then regularly 
employed by the Corporation." (Alteration in original.) 
3. See Utah R. Evid. 401 ("'Relevant evidence'" means evidence 
(continued...) 
support of Eggett's claim for breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Indeed, Wasatch makes no argument why 
this evidence should not be admitted in support of Eggett's good 
faith claim. 
121 In Olympus Hills, Olympus Hills brought suit against Smith's 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
case arose because Smith's, an anchor tenant at the Olympus Hills 
center, relocated its supermarket and opened a "warehouse box 
store" in its place. Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 448. Smith's 
argued that its opening the "warehouse box store" satisfied the 
terms of its lease, which required Smith's to operate "any lawful 
retail selling business." Id. 
1f22 At trial, Olympus Hills presented evidence that customer 
traffic at the center decreased when Smith's relocated the 
supermarket and opened the "warehouse box store." Id. at 454. 
Olympus Hills also presented evidence that the decrease in 
customer traffic adversely affected its tenants. See id. 
1}23 Smith's, on the other hand, argued that the evidence was 
"irrelevant and highly prejudicial," id. , claiming that "the 
'lease obligate[d] Smith's to run a business in that space and 
not to generate a lot of traffic for this center.'" Id. The 
trial court concluded that "although the testimony was not 
admissible as to a contractual duty by Smith's under the lease to 
generate traffic, it was relevant to determining whether Smith's 
had breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
^24 We determined that "the traffic evidence is relevant to 
whether Smith's breached its covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing[, because] . . . Smith's was obligated, in good faith, to 
choose a business to operate in the leased space." Id. 
Accordingly, we concluded that the trial court did not "abuse [] 
its discretion in admitting the evidence." Id. at 456. 
^25 In the present matter, Wasatch argues the trial court erred 
by "admitting Eggett's adjustments to company book value contrary 
to the parties' clear agreement that the audited financial 
statement conclusively established book value." Wasatch does 
not, however, explain why such evidence is not admissible to 
prove Eggett's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Indeed, the trial court alluded to possible bias 
3. ( ...continued) 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable."). 
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by Wasatch in omitting the adjustments in its retained earnings 
for June 30, 1997: 
The Court: Okay. The Court has already 
indicated to you that it's the Court's view 
that the generally accepted accounting 
principles may be affected by discretionary 
calls within the management or others in the 
corporation and thus I believe that the 
plaintiff should have the opportunity to 
present adjustments to that statement. 
[Eggett is] not going to be specifically 
bound to the audited statement of June 3 0 or 
the unaudited statement of December, [193 96, 
the June 30, [19]97, for the reason that 
after his termination by the corporation 
financial decisions that are discretionary 
may be made and the making of those 
discretionary decision [si can affect his 
value should the corporation elect those 
decisions obviously inconsistent with his 
benefit. And, thus, he should be allowed to 
challenge that and show that reasonable 
adjustments should be made to the financial 
statements as then audited because of the, 
let's say, bias that had been incorporated by 
discretionary calls of the officers. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[^2 6 We conclude that although the adjustments may be extrinsic 
evidence and not admissible to vary the terms of the Shareholder 
Agreement, they are "relevant to determining whether [Wasatch] 
had breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing," 
Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 454, which is inherent in every 
contract, see Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30,1(19, 996 P.2d 
1043, by not including the adjustments in its June 30, 1997 
retained earnings. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not 
exceed its permitted range of discretion in admitting the above 
evidence. See Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 455. 
II. Clarification of Special Verdict Question No. 5 
and the Jury's Response to that Question 
1(27 Next, Wasatch argues the trial court "erred by altering the 
special verdict question to interpose its own view of the 
evidence after the jury had rendered its verdict." We disagree. 
K28 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(r) states that " [i]f the 
verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected 
by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be 
sent out again." Id. Further, in Joraensen, our supreme court 
explained: 
[W]here it is apparent that there is some 
patent error in connection with the verdict, 
the [trial] court may of course call the 
matter to the[] [jury's] attention and direct 
them to redeliberate. In that regard it has 
been held, sensibly and properly, that where 
an amount is erroneously included the court 
may direct the jury to retire and correct it. 
The trial court appears to have acted not 
only within its prerogative but properly and 
discreetly in handling the situation. 
Id. at 935-36. 
^29 We find additional case law from other jurisdictions 
regarding the clarification of jury verdicts persuasive. In 
Romano v. U-Haul Int'1, 233 F.3d 655 (1st Cir. 2000), the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $0 in 
compensatory damages, $15,000 in nominal damages, and $625,000 in 
punitive damages. See id. at 661. The trial court "surmised 
that the jury probably confused nominal with compensatory damages 
and proposed resubmitting the two questions, after repeating the 
jury instructions, to the jury." Id. at 670-71. 
1|30 Following the trial court's resubmission of the two 
questions and the jury instructions, the jury asked the trial 
court if only $1 could be awarded in nominal damages. See id. at 
661 The jury then proceeded to award the plaintiff $15,000 
compensatory damages and $0 in nominal damages. See id. The 
defendant appealed the resubmission of the interrogatories back 
to the jury. See id. 
1{31 On appeal, the First Circuit explained that n[t]he standard 
of review for a determination of resubmission of special verdict 
questions is for abuse of discretion." Id. at 671. The court 
then explained that the trial court's "decision to resubmit the 
two questions and allow the jury an opportunity to correct its 
mistake" was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 672. The court 
concluded: 
The [trial] court's interpretation of the 
jury's verdict made logical sense. It did 
not take the decision-making role away from 
the jury and gave the jury a second chance to 
render a proper verdict. The [trial] court 
was clear in its instruction of what appellee 
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needed to prove in order to be entitled to 
compensatory damages. . . . The jury was not 
forced or coerced by the judge into reversing 
the nominal and compensatory damage awards. 
Id. at 672. 
^32 In Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 108 F.3d 1186 
(10th Cir. 1997), the Tenth Circuit concluded that the trial 
court abused its discretion by refusing the plaintiff's request 
to ask the jury to clarify its damage awards. See id. at 1191. 
The court explained that "we approve [] [of] the practice of 
asking the jury to clarify its meaning when the [trial] court is 
faced with an ambiguous verdict." Id. "'[P]ermitting 
questioning of jurors . . . promotes the value of judicial 
economy; otherwise, in the event of an ambiguity the court would 
be left with no other remedies than to order a new trial, even 
though a simple inquiry could clear up questions about how to 
read the damages verdict.'" Id. (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. 
v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1548 (10th Cir. 1993)). Finally, the 
court reasoned that "ordering a new trial . . . takes the case 
away from the jury that heard the case and that could decide it 
if given a chance to cure the ambiguity." Id. at 1192. 
If33 In the present matter, both parties were permitted to argue 
(1) what amount constituted Wasatch's retained earnings for June 
30, 1997, and (2) what the book value was for Eggett's Wasatch 
shares. Wasatch argued that its June 30, 1997 retained earnings 
were $57,703, and the stockholders' capital contributions totaled 
$75,452. As such, Wasatch argued that the book value for all 
Wasatch stock was $133,155, and Eggett's shares, 36.5%, were book 
valued at $27,540. 
[^34 Eggett, on the other hand, argued that the adjustments 
should be included in the June 30, 1997 retained earnings, 
bringing Wasatch's retained earnings to $682,000. As such, 
Eggett argued that the total book value for Wasatch stock was 
$757,452, and Eggett's shares, 36.5%, were book valued at 
$255,419. 
1[3 5 In light of these arguments, the trial court could have 
surmised "that there [wa]s some patent error in connection with 
the verdict," Jorgensen, 383 P.2d at 935, when the jury responded 
to special verdict question no. 5 and awarded Eggett 
$135,671.61.4 If so, the trial court would have "acted . . . 
within it [s] prerogative." Id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r). 
H3 6 First, assuming question no. 5 requested that the jury 
determine the book value for all of Wasatch's stock, neither 
Wasatch's nor Eggett's figures results in the jury's figure of 
$135,671.61. Although Wasatch's figure is close, that further 
strengthens the possibility that there might have been an error 
in arriving at the figures. Second, assuming the question 
required the book value for only Eggett's shares, neither 
Wasatch's nor Eggett's figures coincide with the jury's figure. 
H3 7 Third, and the most likely explanation, the trial judge, 
being intimately familiar with the figures argued during four 
days of trial, realized that the jury chose only to include a 
portion of the adjustments requested by Eggett in its 
calculations of Wasatch's June 30, 1997 retained earnings. 
Indeed, Wasatch's year-end audited financial statements, $75,452, 
plus the $296,252 "suspense account," combine to total $371,704, 
which if multiplied by 36.5%, totals $135,671.61, the exact 
figure the jury awarded. 
1|3 8 To alleviate any possible confusion, the trial judge, having 
(1) reread the question to the jury foreperson, (2) determined 
that the question was confusing, and (3) informed Wasatch's 
counsel that he would not let the question stand if it was 
confusing, made the following inquiry of the jury: 
The Court: We know from the facts of this 
case that . . . Eggett owns 3 6.5%. If I 
interpret your answer to this question to be 
$135,000 for book value. That would mean 
that he would be entitled to 36.5% of 
$135,000.00. If I understand it the way I 
have now asked you the question, he is 
entitled to $135,671.61 which is a number 
that you have come to by some calculation 
method for the purchase of his shares of 
stock. So, in other words, this figure, 
$135,000, is a representative smaller figure 
due to him which represents 3 6 percent of X 
which is the larger number. All right? 
4. Special verdict question no. 5 states that " [o]n the date for 
evaluation of the shares that you selected above, what was the 
'book value' of Wasatch . . . as defined by the . . . Shareholder 
Agreement?" 
Now, I want to be sure that I understand that 
correctly and if any of you disagree with 
that, I want to know that. 
1|3 9 Based on the above inquiry and our review of the record, we 
conclude that the trial court's questions to the jury regarding 
its response to question no. 5 neither "forced" nor "coerced" the 
jury to alter its verdict. Romano, 233 F.3d at 672. Further, we 
conclude that the trial court's actions "did not take the 
decision-making role away from the jury," id., but gave the jury 
the opportunity "to render a proper verdict." Id. 
|^40 Finally, we agree with the rationale set forth in both 
Romano and Unit Drilling that permitting the trial court to 
question the jury regarding an ambiguous verdict promotes 
judicial economy and alleviates the need for a new trial when a 
simple inquiry may cure the ambiguity. Indeed, we commend the 
trial judge's thoroughness and attention to detail. Trial 
judges, when faced with similar situations, should have the 
latitude to ask questions in order to determine the true verdict 
of the jury. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in clarifying special verdict 
question no. 5 and the jury's response to that question. 
III. Attorney Fees 
1(41 Finally, Wasatch argues the trial court erred in awarding 
Eggett attorney fees because Eggett's counsel failed to apportion 
the recoverable and nonrecoverable fees. However, our review of 
the record reveals that Wasatch failed to marshal the evidence 
the trial court relied upon in awarding Eggett his attorney fees. 
Indeed, Wasatch neither provided this court with a transcript 
from the trial court's hearing on March 24, 2000, concerning 
attorney fees, nor any order from that hearing. 
[^42 In Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, 973 P. 2d 431, we explained, 
"The marshaling process is not unlike 
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must 
extricate himself or herself from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists. 
After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous." 
Id. at ^24 (citation omitted) . 
1J43 Further, " [w] hen an appellant fails to meet the heavy burden 
of marshaling the evidence, . . . we assume[] the record supports 
the findings of the trial court." Id. (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Here, Wasatch failed to satisfy the 
marshaling requirement. Therefore, "we assume[] the record 
supports the findings of the trial court" and its decision to 
award Eggett his requested attorney fees. Id. (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
1J44 We conclude that the trial court did not exceed its 
permitted range of discretion in admitting evidence of 
adjustments to Wasatch's June 30, 1997 retained earnings. 
Further, we conclude that the trial court did not exceed its 
permitted range of discretion by clarifying special verdict 
question no. 5 and the jury's response to that question. 
Finally, we affirm the trial court's decision to award Eggett 
attorney fees. 
|^45 The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. 
Wilfiam7A. Thorne, Jr./^tidge 7^/uT d< 
^46 WE CONCUR: 
^^^>^ 7* ^(X^^^^^i^ 
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WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 97-0906444 
Judge David S. Young 
This action came on for trial beginning November 3, 1999, before the Court and jury, the 
Honorable Judge David S. Young, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was represented by 
Perrin R. Love of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson. Defendant was represented by Robert L. 
Stevens of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. 
The parties concluded the presentation of evidence and rested their cases on November 10, 
1999. Following instruction as to the law to be applied and closing arguments by counsel, the jury 
Judgment @ 
retired to deliberate, make findings of fact, and answer special interrogatories in a Special Verdict 
Form, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
On November 10,1999, after due deliberation, the jury returned in open court the following 
verdict: 
The total amount of additional compensation to be 
awarded to Roger Eggett for the period from 
January 1,1997, through May 1, 1997: $ 11,888.35 
The total amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett 
as book value for his shares of stock in 
Wasatch Energy Co.: $ 135,671.61 
Total amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett: $ 147,559.96 
As the Court read the Special Verdict Form, the Court polled the jury to determine whether 
the figure of $135,671.61 represented the book value of Roger Eggett's shares of stock (which the 
evidence showed was 36.5 per cent of the total number of outstanding shares), or the book value of 
Wasatch Energy in total. Each of the eight jurors stated affirmatively that $ 135,671.61 was the book 
value of Roger Eggett's shares, and was the amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett. 
Based upon the jury verdict, the Court found Roger Eggett to be the prevailing party in this 
action. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the verdict of the jury and good cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is hereby entered in 
favor of plaintiff Roger Eggett and against defendant Wasatch Energy Co., in the amount of 
$147,559.96, together with prejudgment interest accruing at a rate pro vided by law from November 
11, 1999, the date following the jury award, until the date this Judgment is entered, and post-
judgment interest from the date that this Judgment is entered until paid. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff Roger Eggett 
may submit to this Court a Memorandum of Costs pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), and an affidavit 
of attorneys' fees and expenses. After defendant has an opportunity to respond, the Court will 
consider any submissions by plaintiff, and enter a supplemental judgment, if appropriate. 
DATED this J0_ daY of 
BY THE COURT: 
^ §&\ 
)avid S. Younir%V \ O v A X v V 
District Court Judge 1 ^"^ *o^v&C 
IMAGED 
Pernn R. Love (5505) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Mam Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)322-2516 
(801) 521-6280 (telecopy) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 




Civil No. 97-0906444 
Judge David S. Young 
Judgment was entered in this matter on January 11, 2000, and is incorporated by reference. Plaintiff 
Roger Eggett moves for entry of a Supplemental Judgment against defendant Wasatch Energy Corp. In 
consideration of the motion, the Court has reviewed the following: 
a. Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses and Attorney's Fees, 
dated December 6, 1999; 
b. Wasatch Energy Corp.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of 
Supplemental Judgment @J 
Attorney. Fees, dated December 16. 1999; II II III I i I I HI I II11 I'll 
c. Reply Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of costs and Attorney's Fees, dated 
December 23, 1999; 
d. Supplemental Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses and 
Attorney's Fees, dated January 13, 2000; 
e. Plaintiffs Verified Memorandum of Taxable Costs dated December 23, 1999; and 
f. Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs, dated January 3, 2000. 
g. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of Costs, 
Expenses and Attorney's Fees, dated March 24, 2000. 
The Court heard argument on the matters raised by these pleadings on March 24, 2000. Plaintiff 
Roger Eggett was represented by Perrin R. Love of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson. Defendant Wasatch 
Energy Corp. was represented by Robert L. Stevens of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. 
Based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, the 
Court finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett is entitled to an award of costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in the 
amount of $60,374.43. The Court finds that these costs, expenses, and fees are reasonable. The Court also 
finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett has made a proper and reasonable segregation between those claims to 
which he is entitled to an award of costs, expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to 
such an award. Specifically, the Court finds that (1) the claims brought by Mr. Eggett to recover book value 
for his shares pursuant to his Shareholder Agreement were the predominant claims at trial; (2) the facts to 
be discovered and tried on Mr. Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement are so intertwined 
with the facts to be discovered and tried on the other claims and counterclaims that it is not possible to 
segregate or to distinguish them. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is proper and reasonable to segregate 
those costs, expenses, and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett before May 16, 1997, from those costs, expenses, 
Zl 
and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett after May 16, 1997, when Mr. Eggett's claims under the Shareholder 
Agreement arose. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good 
cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Supplemental Judgment 
is entered in favor of plaintiff Roger Eggett and against defendant Wasatch Energy Corp., as follows: 
Costs, Expenses, and Attorney's Fees S60,374.43 
Prejudgment interest from November 11, 
1999 through January 10, 2000, on the 
Judgment amount of $147,559.96 S 2,466.07 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff Roger Eggett is awarded 
postjudgment interest at an annual rate of 7.67 per cent on the Judgment amount of $147,559.96 from 
January 11, 2000, until paid. Plaintiff Roger Eggett is awarded postjudgment interest at an annual rate of 
7.67 percent on the Supplemental Judgment amount of $60,374.43 from the date that this Supplemental 
Judgment is entered until paid. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), the Court taxes costs in the amount of $ 2,157.08. These costs are 
included in the award of $60,374.43, and are not a separate award. 
my i o J999 
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WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No. 97-0906444 
Judge David S. Young 
WE THE JURORS empaneled in the above-captioned case find the issues of fact and answer 
the special Interrogatories to us as follows: 
I. EGGETT'S CLAIMS 
1. Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its agreements or obligations to Roger 
Eggett by not paying Mr. Eggett the full amount of compensation to which he was entitled for all 
or any part of the period from January 1, 1997 through May 1, 1997. 
No ANSWER: Yes Y 
2. If the answer to Question No. 1 is "yes", what is the total amount of additional 
compensation that Wasatch Energy owes to Roger Eggett for all or part of the period from January 
W* I.IW7 %( 
igh Ju^2Uft^-7? ° 1, 1997throu£ 
s IIRS8 oo. 
26 
3. Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its agreements or obligations to Roger 
Eggett, by terminating Roger Eggett for cause and not paying him book value for his shares of stock? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If you answered question no. I "yes:" answer question no.s 4 and 5. If you answered 
question no. 3 "no," skip to question no. 6. 
4. Under the SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT between the parties, on what date was 
the book value of Eggett5 s shares to be determined after he resigned? (Check one). 
June 30,1996 
December 31, 1996 
X June 30, 1997 
5. On the date for evaluation of the shares that you selected above, what was the "book 
value" of Wasatch Energy as defined by the Shareholders Agreement? 
k Answer this question only if you answered either question no. 1 as "YES" or question no. 
3asJ>te^ ^ ^ 
6. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts o^omissions of Wasatch 
Energy, as alleged by Eggett, were the result of willful and malicious or intentional fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard of the 
rights of others? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
II. WASATCH ENERGY CLAIMS 
7. Do you find that Roger Eggett breached his fiduciary duties and/or breached his 
compensation and reimbursement agreements with Wasatch by receiving unauthorized compensation 
or abusing his expense account? 
ANSWER: Yes No / 
8. If your answer to question no. 7 is "YES," what is the amount of excessive 






If you answered question no. 7 as "YES" answer the following question. 
9. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of Roger 
Essett as claimed by Wasatch Energy were willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent or 
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard the rights of others such that 
punitive damages should be awarded? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
zo 
DATED this /d day of )jcn^^~ 19 f £ 
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1 MR. LOVE: They sent me down (inaudible) to 
2 figure out which was which, we could only come up with one 
3 copy. 
4 THE COURT: Had I known that, I would have had 
5 the clerk make some while we were waiting. Do you want to 
6 step up here and just do this. Okay. The record may show, 
7 we're returning to the record at the request of counsel 
8 without the jury present. 
9 Mr. Stevens. 
10 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, this is my motion for a 
11 partial dispositive ruling at the conclusion of the 
12 evidence. The ruling I'm asking for with regard to the 
13 value of shares and book value I think Mr. Eggett testified 
14 that he understood it to be a June 30 date that was 
15 intended and we agreed with that. We have an audited 
16 statement that has specific dates. The agreement requires 
17 that it be the audited statement from the auditors and the 
18 accrual and general accepted accounting practices and such. 
19 Therefore, we feel that that is the number that should be 
20 in here and that should not be left to the jury. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. And I've already indicated to 
22 you — well, first let me ask Mr. Love. Do you desire to 
23 respond on the record? 
24 Mr. Love? Do you desire to respond to that? 
25 MR. LOVE: I would just rest on what I said 
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1 earlier, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. The Court has already 
3 indicated to you that it's the Court's view that the 
4 generally accepted accounting principles may be affected by 
5 discretionary calls within the management or others in the 
6 corporation and thus I believe that the plaintiff should 
7 have the opportunity to present adjustments to that 
8 statement. He's not going to be specifically bound to the 
9 audited statement of June 30 or the unaudited statement of 
10 December, x96, the June 30, *97, for the reason that after 
11 his termination by the corporation financial decisions that 
12 are discretionary decisions may be made and the making of 
13 those discretionary decision can affect his value should 
14 the corporation elect to make those decisions obviously 
15 inconsistent with his benefit. And, thus, he should be 
16 allowed to challenge that and show that reasonable 
17 adjustments should be made to the financial statements as 
18 then audited because of the, let's say, bias that had been 
19 incorporated by discretionary calls of the officers. Okay? 
20 MR. STEVENS: Thank you. 
21 THE COURT: Now, I hope I've made that clear. If 
22 there is any question about that, I think we've discussed 
23 that multiple times. It just seems to me that it would be 
24 inequitable to require him to simply accept an audited 
25 statement when that audited statement was prepared after 
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the time that he had been terminated from the corporation 
and can be influenced by discretionary decisions made by 
the board or remaining officers. All right. Thank you. 
All right. The record we're reconvened outside 
the presence of the jury. There has been a request for 
another matter of law to be dealt with. 
MR. LOVE: Just a quick question, your Honor. 
How do you want to proceed in closing argument because 
there are counterclaims. Do you want to go my opening, 
Bob's opening, my rebuttal, Bob gets a rebuttal for 
counterclaims or do you want to go no rebuttal or how do 
you want to proceed? 
THE COURT: I want to go with three arguments. I 
want to go with the plaintiff's opening argument, the 
defendant's response, and the defendant's in affect opening 
argument and the plaintiff's rebuttal. 
MR. LOVE: Okay. 
MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, it would seem that we 
would be entitled to rebuttal with regard to our 
counterclaim. 
THE COURT: I'll give you that then. Okay. So, 
we'll have four arguments. Just that, that, I don't want 
to go beyond that. 
MR. LOVE: Are there any time constraints? 
THE COURT: Well, I wanted to have this to the 
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1 resignation. And I believe that that is something that 
2 they have the burden to prove the validity of. 
3 Okay. The discussions were all held timely, the 
4 reservation in relation to that jury instruction was timely 
5 and considered before it was given during the course of the 
6 trial. 
7 We'll be in recess awaiting the deliberation of 
8 the Jury. 
9 (Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
10 THE BAILIFF: Third District Court will resume 
11 session. Please be seated. 
12 THE COURT: All right, the record may show we 
13 convened in the presence of the Jury. 
14 Mr. Robertson, were you selected as the 
15 foreperson of the jury? 
16 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Have you reached a verdict? 
18 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, we have, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Would you give it to the bailiff for 
20 delivery to the Court, please. 
21 Thank you. I will read the verdict. 
22 Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its 
23 agreement or obligations to Roger Eggett by not paying Mr. 
24 Eggett the full amount of compensation to which he was 
25 entitled for all or part of January 1, 1997 through May 1, 
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1997? The answer is yes. 
Two, if the answer to question number one is yes, 
what is the total amount of additional compensation which 
Wasatch Energy owes to Roger Eggett for all or part of the 
period of January 1 through May 1. $11,888.00. 
Number 3. Do you find that Wasatch Energy 
breached its agreement or obligations to Roger Eggett by 
terminating Roger Eggett for cause and nor paying him book 
value for his shares of stock. Answer: Yes. 
Then, skipping to question four. The 
shareholders agreement between the parties, on what date 
was the book value of Eggett's share to be determined after 
he resigned? June 30, 1997. 
Question 5. On the date for evaluation of the 
shares you selected above, what was the book value of 
Wasatch Energy as defined by the shareholders agreement? 
That, the answer is $135,671.61. 
And then on to the second series of questions in 
part 2, Wasatch Energy's claims as question number seven. 
The answer to that is no, thus prohibiting any further 
responses from the jury. 
Do I understand, Mr. Robertson, that the jury's 
decision, as I've read this question number five, is this 
the value that the jury believes should be paid for the 
shares? 
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MR. ROBERTSON: We believe that to be the book 
value. 
THE COURT: And so— 
MR. ROBERTSON: Paid for the shares. 
THE COURT: So from the, I think the question was 
confusing and that's why I wanted to ask that question. 
The book value would be the value from which — yes, did 
you have a question? 
MR. STEVENS: It seems rather inappropriate to be 
coming up with questions for the jury at this time. The 
question is as it's stated and it's answered as it's 
answered. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to allow that to 
stand if it is a mistake. So, if I can find that out now, 
I will find that out now. 
What you're saying by that, let me just be sure 
that I understand what we're talking about. Is this the 
value that you think the corporation owes to Mr. Eggett to 
purchase his shares? 
MR. ROBERTSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Now I'm going to ask that 
question of all of you as jurors if you concur in that 
determination. Let me go through. 
Do either of you desire that I poll the jury on 
any other questions? 
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1 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, may we approach the 
2 bench? 
3 THE COURT: You may. 
4 (Whereupon the following sidebar was held: 
5 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, the way this question is 
6 worded and the way this has been argued has been entirely 
7 talked about, at least from our point of view, (inaudible) 
8 book value of the company is. We know that Mr. Eggett has 
9 36.5%. That's the number that should be applied here. To 
10 have them now— 
11 THE COURT: Okay, I'm not going to allow that and 
12 you can make a record of it but I'm not going to allow it. 
13 I don't believe it's consistent with their desire. 
14 MR. STEVENS: And it's certainly not consistent 
15 with what they've just said. 
16 THE COURT: That's exactly right and so— we'll 
17 make a record of it and that's just fine.) 
18 
19 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to poll the jury on 
20 particularly question number 5. The question, here's the 
21 problem and I want to just explain it to the jury so that I 
22 get a clear understanding of what your decision is. 
23 We know from the facts of this case that Mr. 
24 Eggett owns 36.5 percent. If I interpret your answer to 
25 this question to be $135,000.00 for book value. That would 
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mean that he would be entitled to 36.5 percent of 
$135,000.00. If I understand it the way I have now asked 
you the question, he is entitled to $135,671.96 which is a 
number that you have come to by some calculation method for 
the purchase of his shares of stock. So, in other words, 
this figure, 135,000, is a representative smaller figure 
due to him which represents 36 percent of X which is a 
larger number. All right? 
Now, I want to be sure that I understand that 
correctly and if any of you disagree with that, I want to 
know that. 
First, Mrs. Hamilton, is that your verdict as 
I've just explained it. 
MRS. HAMILTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Ms. Olson? 
MRS. OLSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Bennion? 
MISS BENNION: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hank? 
MR. HANK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Robertson? 
MR. ROBERTSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Smith? 
MRS. SMITH: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Corpron? 
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1 MR. CORPRON: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Sindt? 
3 MR. SINDT: Yes, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Okay, I'm going to enter, 
5 well, we have the record and we have indicated on the 
6 record what my understanding is. This question, I find, is 
7 ambiguous in its right and the way it was written and that 
8 the jury was spoken that the value is due to Mr. Eggett is 
9 for the lost compensation, $11,888.00 and for his shares of 
10 stock, $135,671,96. That means that from this decision of 
11 the jury that those two numbers combined would equal 11, I 
12 messed up, excuse me. All right, those numbers combined 
13 would be $147,559.96. All right. 
14 I want to thank you for your service. You can 
15 see the decisions to be made at the court and challenges of 
16 cases like this are difficult and I hope that you've 
17 learned some lessons also from the combined wisdom of 
18 sharing your views among each other and deliberating. Some 
19 of that may have been frustrating at times, but I accept 
20 our verdict. I think you've rendered a faithful service 
21 and an appropriate service. Unfortunately I have to tell 
22 you that the legislature in its wisdom has asked you to do 
23 one other thing and that is to briefly respond to some 
24 questionnaires. I will now excuse you into the jury room. 
25 This should take just a few moments. 
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Since you're excused from your service. There 
will be no further prohibition to your discussing this case 
and if you wish to discuss the matter with the attorneys or 
anyone else, you are free to do so. If you wish not to, 
that also will be respected. You're now excused. Thank 
you. 
All right, do either of you have any questions or 
matters that you want to deal on the record before we 
conclude. 
MR. STEVENS: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Stevens. 
MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, this would simply 
(inaudible) took care but the sidebar — 
THE COURT: Yes, indeed. I will indicate to you 
that with this system the sidebar will have been picked up 
on part of the record. I know we're all old practioners 
that don't remember sidebar conferences being recorded. 
But, this has been. 
MR. STEVENS: Okay. I just want to make clear 
our objection to the questions from the bench with regard 
to question number five. Question number five as written, 
I think, was agreed to by both parties. It was answered as 
it was answered and it was inappropriate, I believe, for a 
new question to be posed to the jury without any review by 
either side or attorneys and created, I think, an error. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Well, you're entitled to have 
2 that preserved for the record and I've told you that. It 
3 seems to me that the number in and of itself causes me to 
4 conclude that it would be irrationally selected if it were 
5 other than that number. For instance, we could go through 
6 and, I don't know how they would have come up with the book 
7 value of that company at 135, if you could help me to 
8 figure that out, that would be fine, but it's entirely 
9 inconsistent with the June 30th, 1997 date. 
10 MR. STEVENS: Well, it's also, their number on 
11 number two, was also, I don't know how they came up with 
12 that one either. I don't know they ever come up with 
13 numbers. 
14 THE COURT: I agree with in that respect and I 
15 don't know how they came up with number two either. But, 
16 it struck me that number five could be a mathematical error 
17 by the way it was written and indeed that's what the jury 
18 confirmed it was. 
19 So, any other questions? 
20 Do you have any questions, Mr. Love? 
21 MR. LOVE: No, I think, obviously, I think what 
22 you did was entirely appropriate because the jury did 
23 express some confusion and clarified its intention. 
24 We will make a claim for attorney's fees. I just 




Tins Agreement (the " Agreement") is made and entered as of the 13th day of April, 
1995, by and among (a) WASATCH OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a Utah corporabon (the 
"Corporabon"), and (b) Roger K Eggett, Jr., Todd D. Cusid,, Curtis R. Chisholm (collecbvely, ihe 
"Shareholders/ and individually, a "Shareholder"). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders own all of the Corporabon's issued and outstanding 
common stock (the "Shares"); 
WTiEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders realize that, in the event of the death 
or disability of one of the Shareholders or the sale of a Shareholder's Shares dunng his lifetime, the 
Corporabon's Shares might pass into the ownership or control of persons other than the remaining 
Shareholders, which could disrupt the harmonious and successful management and operabon of the 
Corporabon; 
WHEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders further realize that, in the event one 
of the Shareholders should terminate employment with the Corporabon by retirement or otherwise, 
such terminabon could disrupt the harmonious and successful management and operabon of the 
Corporabon; 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders feel that their mutual interests and the interests of the 
Corporabon mandate the imposibon of certain restncbons on themselves and on the Corporabon with 
respect to the bansfer of the Shares, and 
W^HEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders have independently concluded that 
the method of valuing the Shares provided in this Agreement is fair and equitable 
NOW, THEREFORE, in considerabon of the foregoing, and the mutual promises, 
obligabons, covenants, and agreements contained herein, as well as the mutual benefits to be derived 




1. Shareholders' Ownership in Corporation. The Corporation has FORTY THREE 
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FOUR (43,334) shares of common stock issued and 
outstanding The Shares are owned as follows: 
Name of Shareholder Number of Shares 
Roger K Eggett, Jr. 24,335 
Todd D. Cusick 10,833 
Curtis R. Qusholm 8,166 
2. Purchase of Shares on Death, Disability, Retirement or Withdrawal of an 
Employee Upon the death, "disability" (as defined in Paragraph 18) or "withdrawal" (as defined in 
Paragraph 18) (collectively, an "Event of Termination"), of an employee/shareholder of the Corporation 
(an "Employee") (a) the remaining Shareholders shall have the right and option, but not the obligation, 
exercisable at any time within ninety (90) days of any Event of Termination, to purchase, and the 
employee /shareholder or, in the event of such employee/shareholder's death or disability, the personal 
representative, executor, or legal administrator of the deceased or disabled employee/shareholder's 
estate (a "Legal Representative") shall, upon the exercise of such right and option by the remaining 
Shareholders, sell to the remaining Shareholder all or part of the stock owned by the terminated, 
deceased or disabled employee/shareholder (including any stock owned by such 
employee/shareholder's spouse, children, issue, or a trust for the exclusive benefit of such 
employee/shareholder, such employee/shareholder's spouse, children, or issue) at the fame of any such 
Event of Termination, for the pnce and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter stipulated; provided 
that if any remaining Shareholder does not purchase his full proportionate allotment of the Shares, the 
unaccepted Shares may be purchased, proportionately, by the other remaining Shareholders withm 
thirty (30) days thereafter. 
In the event that all or part of the stock owned by an Employee (including any stock 
owned by the Employee's spouse, children, issue, or a trust for the exclusive benefit of the Employee, 
the Employee's spouse, children, or issue) is not purchased in accordance with the preceding paragraphs 
(a) the Corporation shall have Bne nght and option, but not the obligation, exercisable at any time within 
120 days of any Event of Termination, to purchase and redeem, and (b) the Employee (in the event of 
withdrawal) or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall, upon the exercise of such nght and 
opfaon by the Corporation, sell to the Corporation, all or a part of ihe stock owned by the Employee 
(including any stock owned by the Employee's spouse, children, issue or a trust for the exclusive benefit 
of the Employee, the Employee's spouse, children, or issue) at the time of any such Event of 
Termination, for the pnce and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter stipulated. 
3 Purchase Pnce. If the Corporation chooses to exercise the nght and option to 
purchase Shares following an Event of Termination, or in the event of a purchase of Shares as otherwise 
specified in ihis Agreement, the purchase pnce to be paid {OT a Shareholder's Shares shall be 6ne value of 
the Shares at the time of the Event of Termination or other purchase, determined as set forth in this 
Paragraph Except in the case of an Employee's "termination for cause" (as defined in Paragraph 18), the 
purchase pnce shall be the "Book Value" (as defined in Paragraph 18) of such stock In the case of an 
Employee's "termination for cause" (as denned in Paragraph 18), the purchase pnce shall be the lesser of 
the price paid by any such Employee for such Employee's stock or fhe "Book Value* (as defined in 
Paragraph 18) of such stock Notwithstanding the preceding two sentences, a lesser or greater purchase 
w 
price for the common stock of the Corporation may be agreed to and specified in writing, so long as the 
Corporation and each of the Shareholders consents thereto in writing. 
4. Method of Payment The purchase price to be paid for any Shares purchased in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be paid as follows: 
(a) Upon the exercise of the right to purchase Shares in accordance with 
this Agreement by the Corporation, then, within 180 days following the Event of Termination, and upon 
the qualification of a Legal Representative of the deceased or disabled Employee's estate, the Employee 
or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall be paid the greater of (i) the proceeds of any 
insurance polity owned by the Corporation covering the deceased Employee's life, as provided in 
Paragraph 11, below (limited, however, to the amount of the purchase price determined under the. 
provisions of subparagraph 3(a), above), or (ii) twenty percent (20%), or more, of the purchase price of 
the Shares at the price determined as provided in Paragraph 3, above. 
(b) Should the amount paid under the provisions of paragraph 4(a), above, 
be less than the full purchase price to be paid for the Shares, then concurrently with the payment of such 
amount, the Corporation or Shareholders), as the case may be, shall execute and deliver to the 
Shareholder or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, a Promissory Note which shall aggregate 
the total unpaid balance of the purchase price owing for the Shares, which Promissory Note shall be 
payable over three (3) years in equal monthly installments commencing immediately following the 
execution of the Promissory Note. The Promissory Note shall bear interest at the rate equal to the prime 
rate of interest charged by ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Salt Lake City, Utah, to its most credit-
worthy customer, as of the date of the Event of Termination, and each payment made shall be applied 
first to the payment of interest and then to the reduction of principal of the Promissory Note. The 
Promissory Note shall provide that in the event of default in payment of interest or of principal, all 
future installments shall become due and payable immediately. Further, in the event of default under 
the Promissory Note, interest shall be assessed at a default rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum 
and, if collection is necessary, the costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be 
assessable. The Promissory Note shall be subject to prepayment, in whole or in part, at any time, and 
shall be assignable by the holder thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in no event shall the aggregate 
amount of the semi-annual payments on the Promissory Note during any fiscal year of the Corporation, 
including principal and interest, exceed twenty percent (20%) of the Corporation's net pre-tax profits for 
the preceding fiscal year. If payments must be reduced as a result of the preceding sentence, then the 
amounts that are not paid when originally due shall be paid in the next succeeding fiscal year in equal 
monthly installments, again subject to the twenty percent (20%) of net profits limitation. 
(c) Upon receipt of the purchase price to be paid pursuant to 
subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b), above, in cash, or in cash and by the Promissory Note, as provided above, 
in payment of the Shares, the Employee or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall execute 
and debver to the Corporation such instrurrients as are necessary and proper to transfer full and 
complete title to the Shares to the Corporation; provided that the Corporation shall immediately assign 
to the Employee or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, as collateral security for the payment of 
the unpaid balance of any Promissory Note so issued, such number of Shares as shall equal in value, as 
determined by this Agreement, the amount of the unpaid Promissory Note. The Share security shall 
then be released proportionately as the Promissory Note is paid. 
(d) Upon the exercise of the right to purchase Shares in accordance with 
this Agreement by a Shareholder, then, within 180 days following an Event of Termination, the purchase 
price shall be determined under Paragraph 3, above, arid the Shareholder(s) in their discretion, shall pay 
the entire purchase price of the Shares in full or pay ten percent (10%), or more, of the purchase price of 
the Shares and, concurrently therewith, execute and deliver to the Shareholder or &e Legal 
Representative, as the case may be, a Promissory Note, which shall aggregate the total unpaid balance of 
the purchase price owing for the Shares, on substantially the terms and conditions set forth in 
subparagraph 4(b), above and subject to the terms and conditions set forth in subparagraph 4(c), above, 
as revised and interpreted to benefit the purchasing Shareholder(s). 
5. Sales of Shares During Lifetime; Right of Co-Sale. Each of the Shareholders 
agrees that, during his lifetime, he will not transfer, encumber or dispose of any portion or all of his 
Shares, except in accordance with and strictly conditioned upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions 
of this Agreement In the event a Shareholder receives a bona fide offer for the sale of his Shares, and 
desires to sell the same, he shall first give notice in writing to me other Shareholders and the 
Corporation setting forth the pnce offered and the terms arid conditions of payment The other 
Shareholders shall then have a penod of thirty (30) days within which to purchase all or part of said 
Shares at the same pnce and on the same terms and conditions Any Shares not purchased within the 
above penod by the other Shareholders shall be offered to the Corporation, at the same pnce and terms, 
and the Corporation shall have the nght within thirty (30) days thereafter to purchase and redeem all or 
part of the Shares. Any Shares not purchased within the above penod by the Corporation shall be 
offered to the other Shareholders, at the same pnce and terms, and the other Shareholders shall have the 
nght within thirty (30) days thereafter to purchase all or part of the Shares. If there is more than one 
other Shareholder, then each Shareholder shall have the nght to purchase such portion of the Shares 
offered for sale as the number of Shares owned by him at such time shall bear to the total number of 
Shares owned by all other Shareholders; provided that if any Shareholder does not purchase his full 
proportionate allotment of the Shares, the unpurchased Shares may be purchased by, if there is more 
than one other Shareholder, the other Shareholders proportionately. 
If all of the offered Shares are not purchased before the expiration of the penods 
specified in the preceding Paragraph, the offering Shareholder may dispose of any remaining offered 
Shares in any lawful manner, except that he shall not sell any such Shares to any other person for any 
pnce or upon any terms other than previously offered without first giving the Corporabon and the other 
Shareholders the nght to purchase the Shares at the pnce and on the terms offered by such other person, 
and any person acquiring such Shares must agree to enter into a Stock Redempfaon/Buy-Sell Agreement 
containing provisions similar to those set forth herein with the Corporation and the persons who then 
own the remainder of the Corporabon's outstanding Shares. 
A sale by a Shareholder under this Paragraph shall not prejudice his nght to continue to 
participate in the operabons of the Corporabon Further, a Shareholder shall not have any vested nght 
to continue to participate in the operabons of the Corporabon, such matter being exclusively within the 
control of the Board of Directors of the Corporabon. 
Notwithstanding any term or condibon of this Paragraph 5, whenever any Shareholder 
proposes to sell any shares of stock of the Corporabon, such Shareholder (the "Proposed Transferor") 
shall provide wntten nobce specifying the terms and condibons of the proposed sale to the other 
Shareholders in the manner specified in this Paragraph 5. If the Corporabon or the other Shareholders, 
as the case may be, decline to purchase the Shares from ihe Proposed Transferor pursuant to this 
Paragraph 5, then, in lieu of such nght and opbon, any or all of the Shareholders shall have the opbon to 
participate in such sale with the Proposed Transferor in the manner hereinafter set forth To exerase the 
opbon, the Shareholders shall give wntten nobce of elecbon to the Proposed Transferor within twenty 
(20) days after the expuabon of the thirty (30) day nobce penod provided Thereupon, each of the 
Shareholders shall have the nght, but not the obligabon, to sell his Shares in the Corporabon to the 
proposed purchaser upon the same terms and condibons specified in the Proposed Transferor's nobce, 
pro rata with the Proposed Transferor, on the basis of their respecbve holdings of stock of the 
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Corporation The number of Shares to be sold by the Proposed Transferor shall be reduced by the 
number of Shares the Shareholders elect to so sell calculated in accordance with the formula set forth in 
the preceding sentence unless the proposed purchaser is willing to purchase all of the Shares proposed 
to be sold by the Shareholders. If the Shareholders exercise such option, the Shareholders shall bear a 
pro rata portion of the expenses incident to such sale Failure by a Shareholder to exercise the opbon 
within the twenty (20) day period shall be deemed a declinabon of any nght to participate in such sale 
provided that such sale is completed within ninety (90) days of the expirabon of such twenty (20) day 
period at a pnce and on terms and condibons set forth in the Proposed Transferor's nobce. Failure to 
meet the foregoing condibons shall require a new nobce and right of co-sale with respect to such sale. 
6. Shareholder Bankruptcy, etc If (a) any Shareholder shall m a l e an assignment 
for the benefit of creditors, (b) a trustee or receiver shall be appointed for any of the assets or properties 
of any Shareholder, (c) any Shareholder shall file a voluntary pebbon m bankruptcy or shall consent to 
the filing of an involuntary pebbon in bankruptcy against him, or shall fail to obtain dismissal of 
bankruptcy proceedings against him within sixty (60) days following the commencement thereof, or 
shall be the subject of an order for relief, or (d) an attachment or execubon shall be levied upon, or a tax 
or other statutory or judicial hen shall be placed upon, any of the Shares now or at any bme hereafter 
held by any Shareholder and shall not be released within ten (10) days thereafter, (collecbvely, an "Event 
of Bankruptcy"), then such Shareholder (the "Bankrupt Shareholder") shall give written nobce to the 
Corporabon and all other Shareholders on or within three (3) days of the day of the happening of the 
Event of Bankruptcy, which nobce shall describe the Event of Bankruptcy. 
Upon receipt of the nobce referred to in the preceding Paragraph, the Corporabon shall 
have the opbon for a period of thirty (30) days to purchase any or all of the Shares owned by the 
Bankrupt Shareholder; provided that, if the other Shareholders do not purchase all of the Bankrupt 
Shareholder's Shares, the Corporabon shall have the right, within an addibonal ten (10) day period, to 
purchase any part or all of the Bankrupt Shareholder's Shares unpurchased; provided further tha t if the 
Corporabon does not purchase any part or all of the Bankrupt Shareholder's Shares, the non-bankrupt 
Shareholder shall have the nght, within an addibonal ten (10) day period, to purchase the unpurchased 
Shares, and provided further that, if there is more tiian one other Shareholder, each Shareholder shall 
have the right to purchase that portion of the unpurchased Shares as the number of Shares owned by 
him at the date of the Event of Bankruptcy shall bear to the total number of Shares owned by all non-
bankrupt Shareholders at that date If any non-bankrupt Shareholder does not purchase his full 
proportionate share of the Shares, such unpurchased Shares may be purchased by the non-bankrupt 
Shareholders proportionately within an addibonal ten (10) day period. If any of the unpurchased Shares 
remain unpurchased by the non-bankrupt Shareholders, any non-bankrupt Shareholder shall have an 
addibonal ten (10) day period within which to purchase such Shaies. The price and terms of the 
purchase and sale shall be as set forth in Paragraph 3, above. 
Any Shares, which become subject to the provisions of this Paragraph and as to which a 
purchase opbon is not exercised, may be transferred pursuant to such assignment for the benefit of 
creditors or such trusteeship, receivership, or bankruptcy proceedings, or upon sale or foreclosure 
under such attachment or levy of execubon or hen, upon the expirabon of the purchase opbon; provided 
that the transferee and such transferee's spouse, if applicable, execute and become parbes to this 
Agreement, and thereby agree to receive and hold said Shares subject to all of the terms and condibons 
of this Agreement 
7. Transfers Between Shareholder and Permitted Transferee. Notwithstanding any 
of the terms or condibons of this Agreement, each Shareholder shall have the right during his or her 
lifetime to transfer all or any part of the Shareholder's Shares, with or without considerabon, to a 
"Permitted Transferee" (as defined in Paragraph 18, below), and the shares may be transferred from any 
such Permitted Transferee back to the Shareholder, provided that any Shares transferred to the 
Shareholder's Permitted Transferee shall remain subject to all of the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement, just as though said transfer had not taken place; and provided further that, at the discrefaon 
and direction of the Corporation, any Permitted Transferee executes a copy of this Agreement In this 
connection, the Shareholder shall have his spouse, determined as of the date of this Agreement or any 
subsequent date, execute the "Consent of Spouses" attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
8. Endorsement of Certificates. The Shareholders agree that all Share certificates 
which they now hold or which they may acquire in the future evidencing stock of the Corporation shall 
be endorsed substantially as follows: 
THIS STOCK CERTIFICATE IS SUBJECT TO A 
SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT, DATED AS OF THE __DAY 
OF , _ EXECUTED BY THE CORPORATION AND 
ALL OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND IS TRANSFERABLE 
ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT 
9. .Alteration or Amendments This Agreement may be altered or amended, in 
whole or in part, at any time by filing with this Agreement a written instrument setting forth such 
changes, dated and signed by the Corporation and all of the Shareholders. 
10. Termination, This Agreement shall terminate upon the earliest to occur of any 
one of the following events: 
(a) The written agreement of the Corporation and all of the 
Shareholders to that effect 
(b) The bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the 
Corporation. 
(c) The cessabon of business of the Corporation. 
(d) A public offering of the capital stock of the Corporation. 
(e) Whenever there is only one surviving party to this 
Agreement bound by the terms of this Agreement 
(f) If not sooner terminated, four (4) years after the 
execution of this Agreement 
11. Insurance Proceeds. The Corporation shall have the right, but no obligation, to 
take out insurance (wrhole life or term or any combination thereof) on the life of any Shareholder and a 
disability insurance policy covering any Shareholder. In the event the Corporation takes out any such 
insurance, the Corporation shall have the right to increase, terminate, or reduce such insurance 
whenever, at the sole discretion of the Corporation, such insurance or additional or less insurance is 
required to assist ihe Corporation in meeting its options or obhgafaons under this Agreement; provided 
that, before the Corporation shall surrender any insurance policy to the insurance company which 
issued the same, the Corporation shall hrst offer such policy to the insured for the same amounts ) 
which the Corporation would be entitled to receive from the insurance company for the surrender of the 
insurance policy. This nght to purchase insurance shall lapse if not exercised within sixty (60) days 
following the sale of a Shareholder's Shares during his lifetime, the receipt of a statement of Shareholder 
disability, the termination of an Employee's employment by the Corporation, or the termination of this 
Agreement 
The Corporation shall be the beneficiary of the policies issued to the Corporation and 
may apply to the payment of premiums any dividends declared and paid on the policies. If the 
Corporation shall receive proceeds from any insurance policy covering the life of a deceased 
Shareholder or a disabled Shareholder, such proceeds shall be paid by the Corporation to the Legal 
Representative of the decedents estate to the extent of the purchase price of the decedents or disabled 
Shareholder's Shares. Such payment shall be deemed to have been made as payment or partial payment 
of the purchase price as provided hereinabove. Any amount in excess of said purchase price shall be 
retained by the Corporation. Payment of the insurance proceeds may be deferred until the expiration of 
ninety (90) days following the deceased Shareholder's death or the disability of a Shareholder. In the 
event the proceeds from such insurance policy or policies are insufficient to pay the purchase price for 
the Shares, as set forth above, then the deficiency shall be paid in accordance with subparagraph 4(b), 
above. 
12. Notices Any and all notices, designations, offers, acceptances, or any other 
communicabons provided for in this Agreement shall be given, m writing, by registered or certified 
mail, which shall be addressed, in the case of the Corporation, to its principal office, and in the case of 
the Shareholders, to their addresses appearing on the stock books of the Corporation 
13. Invalid Provision; Severability. The invalidity or unenforce ability of any 
particular provision of this Agreement shall not affect the other provisions hereof and the Agreement 
shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid provision were omitted. 
14. Legal Effect, Future Share Issuances The provisions of this Agreement shall be 
deemed covenants running with the ownership of the Shares of the Corporation presently owned by the 
Shareholders and all future issuances of stock by the Corporation, and shall be binding upon and inure 
to the benefit of the parties hereto, and also upon their heirs, executors, legal administrators, successors 
or assigns; and the parties hereby agree for themselves and their heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors or assigns, to execute any instruments and to perform any act which may be necessary or 
proper to earn7 out the purposes of this Agreement 
15. Involuntary Transfers, Void Transfers In the event that any portion of the 
Shares of any Shareholder of the Corporation, or any interest therein, shall be acquired by any third 
person, firm or corporation as a result of execubon, attachment or judicial sale, by operabon of law or in 
any manner other than a voluntary bansfer by said Shareholder, the Shares so acquired by said third 
person, firm or corporabon shall remain subject to the terms and condibons of this Agreement and to 
the rights of the Corporabon and the other Shareholders of the Corporabon hereunder, and the person, 
firm or corporabon so acquiring said Shares shall be required, as a condibon precedent to bansfer of 
said Shares to enter in an Agreement containing provisions similar to those set forth herein with the 
Corporabon and the persons who then own the remainder of the Corporabon's outstanding Shares. 
Otherwise, any bansfer or attempt to bansfer any Shares in violabon of the terms of this Agreement 
shall not be valid. The bansferee shall not be deemed to be the shareholder of such Shares, or enbtled to 
any rights thereon, and the Corporabon shall refuse to bansfer any Shares on its books to the alleged 
bansferee thereof. 
16. Imuncbve Relief. The parbes hereby declare that it is impossible to measure in 
money the damages which will accrue to a party or person bound hereby or to the Legal Representabve 
of a deceased or disabled party or person by reason of a failure to perform any of the obligations under 
this Agreement Therefore, if any party hereto or the Legal Representative of a deceased or disabled 
Shareholder or a Permitted Transferee shall institute any action or proceeding to enforce the provisions 
hereof, any person (including the party against whom such an action or proceeding is brought) hereby 
agrees that the court in such an action is brought may grant injunctive relief and hereby waives the 
claim or defense therein that such parry, Legal Representative, or Permitted Transferee has an adequate 
remedy at law, and such person shall not urge in any such action or proceeding the claim or defense that 
such a remedy at law exists Any sale, transfer, or other disposition made in violation of this Agreement 
shall be null and void and of no force or effect 
17 Provision in Will This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties to this 
Agreement, their heirs, legatees, executors, administrators and assigns To this end, each party to this 
Agreement shall maintain in effect at all times a will directing his or her representative to carry out the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement and to execute any and all documents necessary to accomplish 
that result, provided that the failure to maintain in effect such a will shall not affect the rights or 
obligations of the parties to this Agreement 
18. Definitions As used in this Agreement, the following terms shall have the 
meanings set forth below. 
(a) Disability For purposes of this Agreement, if at any time in the opinion 
of the Corporation a question arises as to the disability of any Shareholder, then the Corporation shall 
promptly employ three (3) physicians who are members of the American Medical Association to 
examine the Shareholder and determine if his physical and mental condition is such as to render him 
incapable of participating in the operations of the Corporation In the event the Shareholder under 
consideration appears to have mental capacity to act in his own behalf, then one (1) of the three (3) 
physicians employed by the Corporation for this purpose shall be a physician selected by the 
Shareholder The decision of said group of three (3) physicians shall be certified in writing to the Board 
of Directors of the Corporation and the Board of Directors may make such certification available to the 
Shareholder or his Legal Representative The Board of Directors of the Corporafaon, xn its sole 
discretion, shall make any final determination of permanent disability and said determination of 
permanent disability shall be binding and conclusive upon the Corporation and the involved 
Shareholder and shall have the effect of terminating the participation of the Shareholder in the 
operafaons of the Corporafaon for purposes of this Agreement 
(b) Permitted Transferee For purposes of this Agreement, (I) a transfer by 
a Shareholder of any of his Shares in the Corporafaon (A) to his spouse or issue of either of them or his 
parents, or (B) in trust for the benefit of himself, his spouse, or issue of either spouse, provided that the 
Shareholder has and at all fames maintains legal and practical control of any such trust, (C) to a family 
partnership in which the Shareholder has and at all fames maintains legal and practical control of the 
affairs of the family partnership and in which the only partners are the Shareholder, his spouse, or the 
issue of either of them or (D) to Shareholders other shall be deemed a transfer of Shares to a "Permitted 
Transferee", and such spouse, or the issue of either spouse, shall be deemed to be a Permitted Transferee 
with respect to such Shares, (u) a person shall be deemed a Permitted Transferee of a Shareholder only 
with respect to the Shares received from such Shareholder or from other Permitted Transferees of such 
Shareholder, and (in) a Permitted Transferee shall be deemed a Permitted Transferee of the Shareholder 
from whom he received such Shares, or if the Shares were received from another Permitted Transferee, 
the Shareholder from whom such Permitted Transferee received the Shares 
(c) Withdrawal, Termination for Cause. Any withdrawal by an Employee 
from participation in the operations of the Corporafaon as a result of the mutual or unilateral decision of 
±u 
the Employee and the Corporation or the Employee, respectively, other than by reason of disability or 
"termination for cause" (as defmed below) For purposes of this Agreement, "termination for cause" 
shall mean termination of an Employee's employment by and with the Corporation, upon fifteen (15) 
days written notice from the Corporation, for "cause" as follows: 
(i) if the Employee has been convicted of, or pleads guilty or nolo 
contendere to, a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, in which case the 
Corporation may terminate such Employee's employment immediately upon the 
occurrence of such conviction or plea; or 
(ii) if the Employee has (A) engaged in fraudulent misconduct with 
respect to the Corporation, or (B) engaged in theft of Corporation assets, or 
(iii) if the Employee has committed any material breach of his 
obligations, covenants, agreements, or warranties to the Corporation; or 
(IV) in the event of 6ne repeated neglect, malfeasance, nonfeasance, 
or other conduct of the Employee in the performance of the services of the 
Employee to the Corporation, any of which (in the reasonable judgment of the 
Board of Directors of the Corporation) is detrimental to the best interests of the 
Corporation; or 
(v) if the Employee has a substance abuse problem. 
(d) Book Value. For purposes of this Agreement, "Book Value" shall mean 
the consolidated net shareholders' equity of the Corporation determined as of the end of each of the 
Corporation's calendar years (commencing December 31,1994) as certified to by the firm of independent 
public accountants then regularly employed by the Corporation, divided by iixe number of the Shares 
issued and outstanding Such determination shall be made on an accrual basis in accordance with 
generall} accepted accounting principles and shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties to this 
Agreement and their Permitted Transferees. Proceeds of any insurance owned by the Corporation on 
the life of a deceased Shareholder shall not be included in any calculation of "Book Value" (as defined 
below) for purposes of arriving at the value of the Shares owned by the deceased Shareholder, his estate, 
heirs, or Permitted Trans fere e(s). The "Book Value" (as defined below) as of December 31 of each year 
(commencing December 31, 1993) shall be based on audited financial statements However, because of 
the time required to prepare audited financial statements as of December 31 of each year, any valuation 
of Shares that is to be made after December 31 of a year but before completion of audited financial 
statements (and the price to be paid) shall be based upon an estimate of "Book Value" (as defmed below) 
as of the appropriate December 31. Such estimate of "Book Value" (as defined below) and purchase 
price shall be adjusted following receipt of the audited financial statements so as to conform with the 
audited financial statements. 
(e) Shareholders' Equity For purposes of this Agreement, "Shareholders' 
Equity" shall mean the shareholders' equity of the Corporation as certified to by the hrm of certified 
public accountants then regularly employed by the Corporation in the Corporation's most recent 
consolidated financial statements. Such determination shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties 
to the Agreement and their Permitted Transferees. 
_Q_ 
19. General Provisions. The parties hereto hereby agTee to the following general 
provisions: 
(a) The administrator, personal representative or Legal Representative of a 
deceased or disabled Shareholder shall execute and deliver any and all documents or legal instruments 
necessarv or desirable to carry out the provisions of this Agreement 
(b) This Agreement shall be governed by die laws of the State of Utah, 
notwithstanding the fact that one of the parties to this Agreement may hereafter become a resident of a 
different State. 
(c) In the event any legal action is required by a party to this Agreement to 
enforce the provisions of same, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit, including 
reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
(d) The rights and obligations of any Shareholder, Permitted Transferee, or 
the heirs or estate of either of them under this Agreement may not be assigned without the pnor written 
consent of the Corporation. 
(e) Future Shareholders of the Corporation may become parties to this 
Agreement by executing a counterpart hereof and, if and when applicable, by having their spouse 
execute a counterpart of the Consent of Spouses attached hereto, whereupon each such signing person 
shall be bound by the terms and conditions of thus Agreement and shall be entitled to the rights under 
this Agreement thereafter, as though such person had originally executed this Agreement 
(f) It is expressly understood that this Agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties hereto and that there are no representations, warranties, or agreements, 
whether express or implied or oral or written, except as set forth herein. The terms and conditions of 
this Agreement may be modified only by a written agreement signed by all the parties hereto. 
(g) No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be deemed, 
or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver 
constitute a continuing waiver. No waiver shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party 
maiung the waiver. 
(h) Unless the context otherwise requires, the singular includes the plural, 
the plural includes the singular, and any masculine or feminine references include the other. 
20. Termination bv Establishment of Public Market for Shares; Termination by 
Shareholder Agreement This Agreement shall automatically terminate and all restrictions upon the 
sale, disposition or transfer of the Shares established by this Agreement shall be removed at such time as 
the Corporation shall, with approval of the Shareholders who own or whose Permitted Transferees own 
two-thirds (2/3) of all of the Shares, through voluntary registration or other voluntary action establish a 
public market for the Shares. This Agreement may be terminated by the affirmative vote of 
Shareholders who own or whose Permitted Transferees own two-thirds (2/3) of all of the Shares. 
(a) In the event that thus Agreement is so terminated, any Shareholder who 
voted against termination and his Permitted Transferee(s), may, within ninety (90) days from such 
termination, offer all, but not some, of their aggregate Shares to the Corporation for purchase upon the 
terms and conditions set forth in Paragraphs 3 and 4, above, and the Corporation shall purchase such 
Shares as therein provided If the Corporation has insufficient "Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below) 
to purchase all of the Shares which are offered to the Corporation by such Shareholders and Permitted 
Transferees, then the Corporation shall purchase such Shares to the extent that it shall have qualified 
"Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below), such "Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below) to be used 
(proportionately, if inadequate to purchase all such Shares) among all of such Shareholders and 
Pennitted Transferees who offer Shares pursuant to this subparagraph. 
(b) Should the Corporation fail to purchase the Shares of any such 
Shareholder or Permitted Transferee or any part thereof, as m Paragraph 20(a), above, then such 
Shareholder or Permitted Transferee may sell those Shares not purchased by the Corporation in 
accordance with the procedure contained in Paragraph 5, above except that no offer need be made to the 
Corporation as called for in subparagraph 20(a), above, and the only parties having a right to purchase 
such Shares shall be the other eligible Shareholders. 
(c) A sale by a Shareholder under this Paragraph shall not prejudice his 
right to continue to be an employee of the Corporation. Neither shall such a Shareholder have any 
vested right to continue to be an employee of the Corporation, such matter being exclusively the 
responsibility of management of the Corporation. 
(d) It is understood that the rights conferred by this Paragraph are optional 
to said Shareholders and Permitted Transferees and that they may retain their Shares in the Corporation 
following termination of this Agreement by agreement of the Shareholders. 
21. Previous Shareholders' and Shareholder's Agreements. This Agreement 
supersedes, amends and replaces all previous Shareholders7 and Shareholder's Agreements. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Agreement to be executed by 
its duly authorized officers and the Shareholders have executed this Agreement, all as of the poky of 
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Report of Independent Auditors 
The Board of Directors and Stockholders 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Wasatch Energy 
Corporation as of June 30, 1997 and 1996, and the related consolidated statements of 
income, stockholders' equity and cash flows for the years then ended. These financial 
statements are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to 
express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits. 
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether the financial statements are free of materia] misstatement. An audit 
includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in 
the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used 
and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial 
statement presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinion. 
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above present fairh. in 
all material respects, the consolidated financial position of Wasatch Energy Corporation 
at June 30, 1997 and 1996. and the consolidated results of its operations and its cash 
flows for the years then ended in conformit) with generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
$0>AA*4£ * y°u^u^ 
August 19, 1997 
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Wasatch Energy Corporation 





Deferred income tax assets and prepaid expenses 
Accounts receivable from related parties 
Total current assets 
Property, plant and equipment: 
Furniture and equipment 
Natural gas producing properties 
























Liabilities and stockholders' 
Current liabilities: 
equity 
Outstanding checks in excess of bank balance 
Accounts payable 
Accrued liabilities 
Accrued income taxes 
Accrued taxes, other 
Total current liabilities 














Common stock, par value S 05 per share: authorized 
100.000 shares. 66,667 shares in 1997 and 1996 
issued and outstanding 












Treasur) stock, at cost; 700 shares in 1997 and 1.800 
shares in 1996 j[lt810) (4.656) 
Total stockholders' equity (75,452 18.172 
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity /S3,2I3,~358 S3.560.026 
See accompanying notes. 
r\ r\ r\ A 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Consolidated Statements of Income 




Cost of sales 
General and administrative 
Income before interest expense and income taxes 
Interest expense 























57,224 $ 119.839 
See accompany ing notes 
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Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity 
Additional Retained 
Common Paid-in Earnings Treasury 
Stock Capital (Deficit) Stock Total 
Balance at July 1. 1995 
Issuance of treasury stock 
Net income 
Balance at June 30. 1996 
Issuance of treasur> stock 
Net income 
Balance at June 30, 1997 
























See accompam mg notes 
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Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows 
Year ended June 30 
1997 1996 
Operating activities 
Net income S 57,224 $ 119,839 
Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash 
provided by (used in) operating activities: 
Depreciation and amortization 70,218 53 J 64 
Changes in operating assets and liabilities: 
Accounts receivable 
Prepaids and other assets 
Accounts payable 
Accrued liabilities 
Accrued income and other taxes 
Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities 
Investing activities 














Additional paid in capital 
Note payable 
Issuance of treasury stock 
Net cash used in financing activities 
Net increase (decrease) in cash 
Cash at beginning of year 
Cash (checks outstanding in excess of bank balance) 














See accompanying notes. 
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Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements 
June 30, 1997 
1. Significant Accounting Policies 
Wasatch Energy Corporation (the Company) was incorporated July 7. 1993, under the 
laws of the state of Utah as Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation. On April 10. 1996, the 
Company changed its name to Wasatch Energy Corporation and formed W'asatch Oil & 
Gas Corporation as a wholly-owned subsidiary. The Company principally buys and 
resells natural gas to retail markets. 
Principles of Consolidation 
The consolidated financial statements include the accounts of Wasatch Energy 
Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation. All 
significant intercompany accounts and transactions have been eliminated. 
Property, Plant and Equipment 
Property, plant and equipment, including natural gas producing properties, are recorded at 
cost. Depreciation is computed using the straight-line method based on estimated useful 
lives of 36 months. 
Gas Imbalances 
Quantities of gas over-delivered or under-delivered under imbalance agreements with 
pipelines, are recorded monthly as prepaids or accrued liabilities using the lower of cost 
or market price for prepaid balances and higher of cost or market price for accrued 
liability balances. Generally, these balances are settled with deliveries of gas. 
Revenue Recognition 
The Company recognizes gas sales when the purchaser takes possession of gas at the 
contracted point of delivery. 
n n n A ri A 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued) 
1. Significant Accounting Policies (continued) 
Credit Risk 
The Company's primary market areas are the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Northwest 
regions. The Company's exposure to credit risk may be impacted by the concentration of 
customers in those regions due to changing economic or other conditions. The 
Company's customers include individuals and companies in numerous industries that 
may be impacted differently by changing conditions. The Company believes that it does 
not ha\e significant potential for credit related losses and that the carrying amount of 
receivables equals fair value. The Company generally does not require collateral from 
customers. 
Market Risk 
The Company enters into swaps and options to secure known margins for the marketing 
of natural gas. Generally, swap contracts invohe exchanging a NYMEX based price or 
fixed price for a local market price. There is a high degree of correlation of such 
contracts with the related physical commodit). Recognized gains and losses on the 
hedged transactions are recorded during the same period as the related physical 
transactions. Failure b\ counter parties to deliver physical volumes may expose the 
Compan) to market risk. 
Use of Estimates 
The preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles requires management to make estimates and assumptions that affect the 
amounts of assets and liabilities or the results of operations. Actual amounts could differ 
from those estimates. 
Income Taxes 
Temporary differences primarily relate to unrealized losses and certain reserves not 
currently deductible for tax purposes. 
Reclassifications 
Certain 1996 amounts have been reclassified to conform with the 1997 presentation. 
8 
2 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued) 
2. Financial Instruments 
At June 30, 1997 and 1996, the Company held swap contracts covering approximately 
3,800,000 MMBtus and 7,000,000 MMBtus of natural gas to be delivered through 
October 1998 and December 1997, respectively. The face value of the contracts was 
approximately $5,500,000 and $9,800,000 at June 30, 1997 and 1996, respectively. The 
market value of the contracts was approximately $627,000 less and $610,000 less than 
face value at June 30, 1997 and 1996, respectively. As of August 19, 1997, the market 
value was approximately $255,000 less than face value. The calculation of the market 
value assumes the Company closed its position on that date and did not recognize 
potential gains on the physical transaction. The fair value of these contracts was based on 
market prices as listed in Inside FERC or quotations from brokers at year end. The 
Compam only enters into swap contracts writh large credit worthy brokers specializing in 
natural gas derivatives. 
3. Income Taxes 
Deferred income taxes reflect the net tax effects of temporary7 differences between the 
earning amounts of assets and liabilities for financial reporting purposes and the amounts 
used for income tax purposes. The Company's deferred tax assets are approximate!} 
$374,000 and $0 at June 30. 1997 and 1996. respectively. 
The components of deferred taxes are primaril) certain reserves and unrealized losses not 
currenth deductible for tax purposes. 

























Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued) 
3. Income Taxes (continued) 
Differences between the reported amount of income tax expense attributable to 
continuing operations for the year and the amount of income tax expense that would 
result from applying domestic federal statutory tax rates to pretax income from 
continuing operations relate primarily to permanent differences. 
4. Related Part}' Transactions 
At June 30, 1997. the Company holds a note receivable from a stockholder for $12,000. 
The Compam also leased office space on a month to month basis from a stockholder 
during 1997 and 1996. Total payments under the lease totaled $33,950 and $19,500 at 
June 30. 1997 and 1996, respectively. 
5. Lease Obligations 
Rental expense for 1997 and 1996 was $63,412 and $19,500. respectively. Future rental 
payments for a non-cancelable office building lease from June 30, 1997 through February 
28. 2000 total $455,000. The Company also has the option to extend the lease for 2 
> ears. 
6. Contingencies and Commitments 
Prepaid Gas Transaction 
During August 1996. the Company, and an outside investor, entered into a prepaid 
natural gas transaction with a supplier. Based on commitments to deliver gas from the 
supplier, the Company entered into swap contracts with brokers to secure a margin on the 
scheduled deliveries. In March 1997, the supplier ceased delivery of its gas to the 
Company, filed suit against the Company to void the contract, and sold its gas reserves to 
a third party. The Company countersued for breach of contract and foreclosure on the 
supplier's properties. 
At June 30. 1997, the Company had recorded as accounts receivable approximately 
$490,000 for payments made to settle the related swap contracts. The Company 
estimates that an additional $400,000 will be paid to settle swap positions through 
December 31, 1997. 
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Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued) 
6. Contingencies and Commitments (continued) 
Fixed Price Derivative Transactions 
At June 30, 1997, the Company held a swap contract with a broker for which there was 
no offsetting physical transaction. The contract settles monthly and calls for the 
Company to pay a local market price for that month and in return receive $1.50 per 
MMBtu. Volumes covered by the contract are 3,700 per day with the contract beginning 
July 1, 1997 and ending on June 30, 1998. Face value of the contract is approximately 
$2,025,750. At June 30, 1997. the Company would incur a loss of approximately 
$283,000 related to this contract if it closed its position. Since inception, the maximum 
potential loss of the contract has been $305,000. 
Other 
Estimates for payments to settle swap contracts are based on current market prices of 
natural gas which can fluctuate significantly. 
The Company has a $1,800,000 revolving line of credit with a bank. As of June 30. 
1997, $250,000 of the $1,800,000 was reserved for an outstanding letter of credit. 
11 
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Perrin R. Love (5505) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)322-2516 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 




WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PERMN R. LOVE 
IN SUPPORT OF AWARD 
OF COSTS, EXPENSES, AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 97-0906444CV 
Judge David S. Young 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and verily states: 
a. I have been a shareholder of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson since September 
1998 ("Clyde, Snow"). Before that, I was a shareholder at Campbell, Maack & Sessions ("CMS"). 
I have served as counsel for Roger Eggett ("Mr. Eggett") in the above-captioned litigation. 
b. I submit this Affidavit in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses, and Attorney's Fees 
of Reasonable Attorney Fees pursuant to the finding of the Court that Mr. Eggett is the prevailing 
party. All statements are based upon my personal knowledge and my review of the billing records 
of Clyde, Snow and CMS. 
3. At trial, the jury awarded to Mr. Eggett SI 1,888.35 in additional compensation due 
Mr. Eggett as damages for breach of his Employment Agreement ("Employment Agreement") dated 
April 21, 1995, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury awarded to Mr. Eggett 
$ 135,671.60, the book value of Mr. Eggett's shares in defendant Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"), 
as damages for breach of the Shareholder's Agreement ("Shareholder's Agreement") dated April 13, 
1995 and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In so awarding, the jury rejected Wasatch's 
defenses and counterclaims that Mr. Eggett was properly terminated for cause or that Eggett had 
taken excessive compensation and abused his expense account. 
4. Mr. Eggett's claim for costs, expenses, and attorney's fees is based upon paragraph 
19(c) of the Shareholder's Agreement, which states in full: 
In the event any legal action is required by a party to this 
Agreement to enforce the provisions of same, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees. 
The Employment Agreement has no comparable provision, and does not authorize either prevailing 
party to recover expenses or attorney's fees. 
5. In making this Affidavit, I follow the four factors identified in Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees: (1) what 
legal work actually was performed; (2) was the legal work reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute or defend the matter; (3) were the hourly rates reasonable compared to others in the 
locality; and (4) what additional circumstances, including the circumstances listed in Rule 1.5 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, affect the reasonableness of the fees. Accord, Cabrera v. Cottrell 
694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1992). 
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6. For the reasons explained below, Eggett is entitled to an award of cost, expenses, and 
attorney's fees in the amount of $56,900.27. In calculating this amount, I have excluded costs, 
expenses, and attorney's fees incurred before May 16,1997, because those fees relate solely to Mr. 
Eggett's claims for additional compensation pursuant to the Employment Agreement, which does 
not authorize an award of costs, expenses, or attorney's fees. 
7. I was retained by Mr. Eggett on or about April 25, 1997, about 10 days after he 
submitted his letter of resignation to Wasatch (to be effective July 14, 1997). Mr. Eggett agreed to 
pay for my representation at an hourly rate of $150.00 per hour. 
8. Initially, I was retained to assist Mr. Eggett in obtaining compensation to which he 
was entitled pursuant to his Employment Agreement for the period January 1,1997 through July 14, 
1997. The scope of my representation changed when I received notice on May 16, 1997, that 
Wasatch had terminated Eggett for cause pursuant to paragraph 2(e) of the Employment Agreement. 
Shortly thereafter, Wasatch informed me that, because Eggett had been terminated for cause, 
Wasatch was entitled to redeem Eggett's shares for par value rather than book value, pursuant to 
paragraphs 3 and 18(e) of Shareholder Agreement. 
9. Accordingly, the scope of my representation expanded on or about May 16,1997, to 
include claims for breach of the Shareholder Agreement, and to obtain for Mr. Eggett book value 
for his shares. These claims required Mr. Eggett to prove that his termination for cause was 
wrongful, that he had not taken excessive compensation or abused his expense account, and that his 
termination was a pretext to deny him book value for his shares. 
10. Because Mr. Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement are inextricably 
intertwined with his claims under the Employment Agreement, and with Wasatch's counterclaims, 
Mr. Eggett is entitled to recover all of his costs, expenses, and fees incurred from the time that Mr. 
Eggett was terminated for cause, and that Wasatch asserted that it was entitled to pay Mr. Eggett par 
*% i 
value rather than book value. This Court has discretion to award all fees where a prevailing party 
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on some, but not all, claims. 
11. In Henslev v. Eckerhart 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a 
prevailing party may recover fees only on the claims on which it prevailed or is otherwise entitled 
to an award, unless all claims involve a common core of fact or legal theory. Where the parties' 
claims involve a common core of facts or related legal theories, much 
of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it 
difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit 
cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. 
461 U.S. at 435. In those situations, where 
a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully 
compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on 
the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award 
may be justified. In these circumstances the fee should not be reduced simply 
because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. 
Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and 
the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds in not a sufficient reason 
for reducing a fee. The result is what matters. 
12. The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the same approach in Sprouse v. Jaeer, 806 P.2d 
219 (Utah App. 1991). In Sprouse, the attorney for the prevailing party apportioned one-third of his 
time in litigation to a contract claim, and two-thirds of his time to other claims (the contract had an 
attorney's fee provision). The trial court awarded the prevailing party all of its fees, and the Court 
of Appeals upheld the award because all claims and issues were so intertwined: 
The trial court has discretion in determining reasonable attorney fees, and, absent an 
abuse of discretion, we will not overturn such an award. Although the minute entry 
is somewhat sketchy, it appears that Sprouse's objection is not to the number of hours 
or to the hourly rate, but rather it is to the fact that the court failed to separate out 
two-thirds of the attorney time that Sprouse considered to be irrelevant because it did 
not pertain to the [contract claim]. However, the court was satisfied that, because 
appellees prevailed on the counterclaim, the foreclosure, and the collection, they 
were entitled to the full amount. Because these complex issues were so intertwined, 
we find the court acted within its discretion in its award of attorney fees. 
806 P.2d at 226 (emphasis added). 
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13. After May 16, 1997, my time was devoted to the litigation as a whole, and not to 
discreet claims under either the Shareholder Agreement or the Employment Agreement. The parties 
prepared for and participated in a mediation in August 1997 that addressed all of the parties' claims 
and counterclaims. Preparation of Mr. Eggett's pleadings obviously related to all claims, as did 
document discovery from Wasatch, Magna Energy International, and Ernst & Young. The 
depositions of Roger Eggett Keith Painter, David Lillywhite, Curtis Chisholm, and Tod Cusick 
related to all claims, as did trial preparation and trial. 
14. Appended to this Affidavit are the billing statements provided to Mr. Eggeit from 
April 25, 1997, through the date of this .Affidavit, by Clyde, Snow and CMS. The time entries 
reflected on the billing statements were recorded on a regular if not daily basis throughout this 
litigation, and were maintained on the CMS and Clyde, Snow computerized billing systems. 
15. From April 25, 1997, through December 31, 1997, Mr. Eggett was billed at a rate of 
5150.00 per hour. Mr. Eggett, however, could not afford to pay this hourly rate. As of October 31, 
1997.1 agreed with Mr. Eggett to defer half of the hourly fee until Mr. Eggett obtained a favorable 
settlement or judgment, and agreed to be paid from the proceeds of that settlement or judgment. 
This was not a modification of the retainer agreement from an hourly to a contingency fee; Mr. 
Eggett agreed that if he did not obtain a favorable settlement or judgment, he would pay the deferred 
fee from other sources. Accordingly, the billing statements from November 1,1997 forward reflect 
an hourly rate of $75.00 per hour. In making this Affidavit, I adjust those billing statements to 
reflect the fees to be awarded at a rate of S150.00 per hour. 1 believe that a rate of $150.00 is 
reasonable, because my hourly rate since January 1, 1998, has been SI75.00. 
16. To summarize the fees and expenses in the billing statements: 
a. Exhibit A is a Statement of Sendees Rendered from April 25, 1997 through 
May 31, 1997. Again, Mr. Eggett seeks an award of fees and costs from May 16, 1997 forward. 
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Those fees total SI,320.00 (8.8 hours); the costs total SI 68.30 (including SI50.00 for the Mediation 
filing fee required by the American Arbitration Association). 
b. Exhibit B is a Statement of Services Rendered for June 1997. The total fees 
are S255.00. The total costs are SI.00. 
c. Exhibit C is a Statement of Services Rendered for July 1997. The total fees 
are $2,250. Total costs are S.60. 
d. Exhibit D is a Statement of Services Rendered from August 1,1997 through 
October 31, 1997. The total fees incuued are $2,407.50, which relate to the mediation conducted 
pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and the preparation of the initial 
pleadings. Total costs are $372.10, which relate primarily to the mediator's fee. This amount 
excludes $175.00 in costs reflected on the billing statement for filing the initial Complaint in Second 
District Court. After filing in Second District Court, I refiled the Complaint in Third District Court. 
Wasatch should not have to pay both filing fees. 
e. Exhibit E is a Statement of Services Rendered from November 1, 1997 
through December 31, 1997. The total fees are $795.00 (at $150.00 per hour), and relate to 
answering Wasatch's counterclaim, settlement negotiations, and preparing discovery requests. Total 
costs are $324.27, which include the Third District Court filing fee. 
f. Exhibit F is a Statement of Services Rendered from January 1, 1998 through 
February 28, 1998. The total fees are $375.00 (at $150.00 per hour). Total costs are $2.83. 
g. Exhibit G is a Statement of Services Rendered for April, 199S. Total costs 
are $10.01. 
h. Exhibit H is a Statement of Services Rendered for May 1998. The total fees 
are $3,060 (at $150.00 per hour). These fees relate principally to the depositions of Mr. Eggett and 
Keith Painter, and the document production from Ernst & Young. Total costs are $46.57. 
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i. Exhibit I is a Statement of Services Rendered for June 1998. The total fees 
are S270 (at $150.00 per hour). Total costs are $5.20. 
j . Exhibit J is a Statement of Services Rendered for August 1998. The total fees 
are 51,200.00 (at 5150 per hour), and relate primarily to the depositions of Curtis Chisholm and 
David Lillywhite. 
k Exhibit K is a Statement of Services Rendered from October 1998 through 
March 1999. The total fees are $360.00 (at $150.00 per hour). Total costs are $397.66. 
1. Exhibit L is a Statement of Services Rendered from April 1999 through 
September 1999. The total fees are $2,925.00 (at $150.00 per hour). These fees relate primarily to 
the deposition of Tod Cusick, to preparing responses to discovery, and to preparing a motion to 
compel responses to discovery. Total costs are $522.60, which include the court reporter fees for 
the Cusick deposition. 
m. Exhibit M is a Statement of Services Rendered for October 1999. The total 
fees are $16,513.00. These fees include my fees of $13,275.00 (at $150.00 per hour), T. Mickell 
Jimenez's fees of $2,622.00 (at $115.00 per hour), and Amy Pelton's fees of $616.00 (at $70.00 per 
hour). Ms. Jimenez is an associate who performed legal research relating to jury instructions and 
other issues, including the definition of "good cause" and ubad faith" in wrongful termination cases, 
liability of a board of directors for wrongful termination, and admissibility of after-acquired evidence 
as a basis for wrongful termination. Amy Pelton is a paralegal who prepared trial exhibits, and 
operated the projector at trial. Total costs are $590.80, which include copying costs for all copies 
of the trial exhibits. 
n. Exhibit N is a Statement of Services Rendered for November 1999 and 
December 1-3. The total fees are $19,762.00. These fees include my fees of $14,175.00 (at $150.00 
per hour), T Mickell Jimenez's fees of $828.00 (at $115.00 per hour), Amy Pelton's fees of 
$4,256.00 (at $70.00 per hour), and Susan Bailey and Donald Maughan's fees of $203.00 (at S70 
7 
2 
per hour). My fees relate to trial preparation (including preparation of the jury verdict form, jury 
instructions, and voir dire questions, as well as preparations of witness exams and opening 
argument), attendance at trial, and post-trial matters (including preparation of this Affidavit). Ms. 
Jimenez continued to perform legal research, primarily for jury instructions, Ms. Pelton attended trial 
as a paralegal to operate the projector and coordinate exhibits, and Mr. Maughan and Ms. Bailey 
performed services as paralegals during trial. Total costs are $812.31, including a charge for on-line 
Lexis research in the amount of $588.13. A detailed accounting of the Lexis research performed is 
provided. 
o. Exhibit 0 is an invoice from Litigation Technology, Inc., for rental of the 
projector and computer at trial, in the amount of SI,435.73. I believe that use of the projector was 
essential to enable the jury to follow and understand the documents establishing that Mr. Eggett's 
termination was wrongful, that Mr. Eggett was entitled to book value for his shares, and to 
establishing book value itself. 
p. Exhibit P are invoices for court reporter fees paid directly by Mr. Eggett. One 
invoice is for $498.80. The other is for $229.00. 
17. I believe these fees were reasonably incurred. On behalf of Mr. Eggett, I took only 
two depositions-Keith Painter and Tod Cusick. Wasatch took all other depositions. To save 
expense, I did not depose Dennis Fox, Brian Watis, Greg Probst, or Ward Coombs, all of whom were 
identified as trial witnesses, and all of whom testified at trial. I also delayed performing any legal 
research until it was absolutely clear that the matter would go to trial. I also was required to file two 
motions to compel because Wasatch initially refused to produce documents that I considered 
relevant, which increased the fees incurred. 
18. Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(4) and Henslev hold that the trial court should 
consider the result obtained in determining the reasonableness of the fee, and that an enhanced fee 
may be appropriate. Given the jury verdict for Eggen and against Wasatch on all claims, I believe 
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that an enhanced fee would be appropriate. Mr. Eggett does not seek an enhancement of fees. 
Instead, I cite this factor simply to underscore the reasonableness of the fees that Mr. Eggett has 
incurred and is entitled to recover. 
19. Some of the costs identified in the Affidavit are taxable costs that may be awarded 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). Mr. Eggett does not seek a double recovery of these costs; if the 
Court awards to Mr. Eggett all of his costs, Mr. Eggett will file a Memorandum of Costs pursuant 
to Rule 54(d) to preserve an independent basis for the award of these costs in the event there is an 
appeal. 
Dated this :£_ of December, 1999. 
Pem^R. Love?/Esq. 
O n t h e ^ d a y of December, 1999, Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn under oath, stated 
that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the contents thereof and the same are true to the 
best of his knowledge, except as to those matters stated to be alleged on information and belief, and 
to those matters he believes them to be true. 
NOTARY P U B U C 
K NICOLE HOLT 
?D*i So.Jth Main #1300 
Sart Lake Crty, UT B4111 
My Co'T'Tvssion Expires 
June 2 1 , 2003 




Perrin R. Love (5505) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)322-2516 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
'/:D:C23 17, 2-U2 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAXE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 




WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPLY AFFIDAVIT 
OF PERRIN R. LOVE 
IN SUPPORT OF AWARD 
OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 97-0906444CV 
Judge David S. Young 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAXE ) 
Pemn R. Love, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and verily states: 
1. I have been a shareholder of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson since September 
1998 ("Clyde, Snow"). Before that, I was a shareholder at Campbell, Maack & Sessions ("CMS"). 
1 ha\ e served as counsel for Roger Eggett ("Mr. Eggett") in the above-captioned litigation. 
2. I submit this Reply Affidavit in Support of Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees to 
respond to the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees 
("Mem. Opp.") submitted by defendant Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"). All statements are based 
upon my personal knowledge and my review of the billing records of Clyde, Snow and CMS. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
3. Contrary to Wasatch's assertion, Mem. Opp. at 2-3, my initial Affidavit properly 
segregates fees incurred on Eggett's claims brought pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement (which 
has an attorney's fee provision) from his claims brought pursuant to the Employment Agreement 
(which has no attorney's fees provision). Eggett seeks no fees or costs incuued before May 16, 
1997, when Wasatch purported to terminate him for cause and to deny him book value for his shares. 
4. From that point forward, there is no principled way to distinguish time or expenses 
incurred on Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement from his claims under the 
Employment Agreement, or from Wasatch's counterclaims. Every fact relating to Wasatch's 
counterclaims for excessive compensation and abuse of Eggett's expense account would have been 
litigated whether or not Wasatch filed a counterclaim, because Wasatch asserted those facts as a 
defense to Eggett's claims for book value for his shares. (Wasatch asserted that Eggett was not 
entitled to book value because he took excessive compensation and abused his expense account, 
justifying his termination for cause.) All of the fees and costs were "necessarily incurred" to 
prosecute Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement, and Eggett is entitled to recover them. 
5. The same is true of Eggett's claim under the Employment Agreement for additional 
compensation between January and May 1997. Because Wasatch claimed that Eggett took excessive 
compensation during this period (and purported to terminate him for it), all of the facts surrounding 
Eggett's 1997 compensation would have been litigated whether or not Eggett pursued a claim under 
the Employment Agreement for additional compensation. 
? 
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6. My initial Affidavit complies with the requirements ofFootev. Clark, 962 F.2d 52 (Utah 
1998), and Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), relied upon by Wasatch, because the 
Affidavit segregates those fees and expenses incurred in pursuing claims under the Employment 
Agreement. Neither Foote nor Valcarce stand for the proposition that a prevailing party cannot 
recover fees and expenses necessarily incurred on claims that entitle the party to fees and costs, 
simply because those fees and costs also relate to other claims. 
7. Neither Foote nor Valcarce is factually similar to the situation here. In Valcarce. the 
litigation involved several phases and several parties. The defendant claimed that the prevailing 
party failed to allocate those fees that were incurred against other parties, or to distinguish those fees 
that were incurred before the defendant was joined in the lawsuit. See 961 P.2dat317. In Foote v. 
Clark, 962 F.2d 52 (Utah 199S), a disappointed home buyer sued the seller for breach of the real 
estate purchase contract (which had an attorney's fee provision), and sued the seller's broker for 
tortuous interference of contract. In requesting attorney's fees, the buyer did not distinguish time 
and expense pursing the breach of contract claims against the seller, and time and expense pursing 
tort claims against the broker. See 962 P.2d at 56-7. 
COSTS 
8. Wasatch objects to many of the costs incurred by Eggett, because they are not taxable 
costs within the scope of Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). .See Mem. Opp. at 6-7. The objection is unfounded, 
because Eggett's right to recover these costs is contractual, not statutory. Paragraph 19(c) of the 
Shareholder Agreement states that "the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees." By its plain language, paragraph 19(c) defines costs to include 
all costs, not just taxable costs, because it defines costs to include attorneys' fees. Those costs that 
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are not properly recoverable as taxable costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) are recoverable pursuant to the 
Shareholder Agreement.1 
9. To respond to Wasatch's objections to specific costs: 
a. Runner Fees. Runner fees were incurred in the ordinary course of business, 
as appropriate, generally to provide hand delivery of pleadings, important documents, or sizable 
documents to court and to opposing counsel. When mailing or faxing was appropriate, those 
methods were preferred, particularly of correspondence between counsel. 
b. Photocopies. Photocopies were made, in the ordinary course of business, of 
correspondence, pleadings, documents, and exhibits, to provide to the client or opposing counsel, 
to maintain records for our files, and for use in discovery and at trial. The vast majority of 
photocopies are for trial exhibits in October and November 1999. The price is $.18 per page, and 
is recorded and allocated to Roger Eggett at the time the copy is made. 
c. Mediation Expenses. Although the Mediation was required by paragraph 9(i) 
of the Employment Agreement, the parties agreed to mediate all claims and to attempt to resolve all 
claims, including Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement. Indeed, I prepared and 
submitted to the mediator a Statement of Position that primarily addressed Eggett's right to book 
value for his shares, and the facts and circumstances establishing that Wasatch terminated Eggett in 
bad faith to deny him book value for his shares. The mediation primarily focused on these issues, 
as well as Wasatch's defense that Eggett was properly terminated for cause because Eggett took 
excessive compensation and abused his expense account. Again, these issues are inextricably 
intertwined because one is a defense to the other. 
2Under Rule 54(d), costs are recoverable "only in the amounts and in the manner provided 
by statute, and generally is restricted to those costs which are "required to be paid to the court and 
to witnesses " Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980). No such restriction 
applies to a contractual provision. Pursuant to Rule 54(d), Eggeti is submitting a separate Verified 
Memorandum of Costs to establish an independent basis for an award of those costs. 
A 
d. Long distance tele-phone calls. All long distance telephone calls were to 
Roger Eggett at the Bear River Lodge, where he was employed, or to his home in Evanston, 
Wyoming, where he moved to run the Bear River Lodge. They were necessary to prosecute Mr. 
Eggett's claims. 
e. Deposition Costs. Wasatch complains that my Affidavit fails to specify 
deposition costs, other than the costs associated with the Keith Painter, Curtis Chisholm, and David 
Lillywhite depositions. To the contrary, paragraph 16.1. of the Affidavit and Exhibit L each specify 
$438 as the court reporter fees for the Tod Cusick deposition. Wasatch cannot deny that the Cusick 
deposition was used at trial. Wasatch argues that Eggett is not entitled to reimbursement for 
transcripts of the Chisholm and Lillywhite depositions, because Wasatch took those depositions. 
Wasatch cites no authority for the assertion and it makes no sense. No Utah authority excludes 
deposition transcripts as a taxable cost, and Form 23 to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifially 
includes as a taxable cost "deposition transcript." Regardless whether a deposition transcript is a 
taxable cost, it is a recoverable costs pursuant to paragraph 19(c) of the Shareholder Agreement. 
Chisholm and Lillywhite were non-party witnesses; their testimony was necessary to develop Eggett's 
case. Eggett would have deposed them if Wasatch had not; and I questioned each witness on behalf 
of Eggett. 
f. Witness Fees. The witness fees are as follows: 
May 29, 1998 Service of Subpoena Duces Tecum $ 5.00 
To Ernst & Young 
October 14, 1998 Service of Subpoena Duces Tecum S 38.00 
on Magna Energy 
October 28, 1999 Trial subpoenas for Keith Painter S 37.00 
and Curtis Chisholm 
November 5, 1999 Service of Trial Subpoenas on Keith S 85.00 
Painter and Curtis Chisholm 
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g. Lexis Legal Research. This research was conducted by Mickell Jiminez, and 
is identified in the billing statements for October and November 1999, Exhibits M and N to my initial 
Affidavit. All of this research related to Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement. To 
summarize those entries, Ms. Jiminez researched wrongful termination issues, both to prepare jury 
instructions and to anticipate issues and evidence that might be raised at trial. These included the 
admissibility of after-acquired evidence as a justification for termination for cause; the right of an 
employer to terminate an employee for cause after the employee has resigned; the right of members 
of a board of directors to rely on reports from employees or other board members; the elements and 
requirements of"bad faith" by members of the board of directors in performing their duties, including 
terminating an officer or employee for cause, and the burden of proof on these issues. Ms. Jiminez 
was required to use Lexis to research case law outside the states encompassed by the Pacific Reporter. 
Moreover, in my opinion, use of electronic research is more efficient and less expensive than 
requiring a lawyer to review regional treatises and other sources of case law. 
h. Use of Projector at Trial. As explained in my initial Affidavit, the projector 
was necessary to present the documentary exhibits to the jury7 in an efficient and comprehensible 
manner 
10. To eliminate ongoing dispute about these matters, however, I have reviewed the billing 
records in light of Wasatch's objections, and make the following redactions to the fees and costs 
identified in the initial Affidavit: 
a. August 28, 1997, "Meet with Roger Eggett to discuss revised fee agreement; 
prepare revised fee agreement," 1.5 hours, $225.00; 
b. October 28, 1997, "Draft Reply to Counterclaim," 1.0 hour, $150.00; 
c. November 25,1997, telephone conference with Eric Olson regarding request 
for cooperation in United litigation; telephone conference with Roger Eggett regarding same," 0.5 
hours, S75.00; 
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d. September 4,1997, runner services to file Complaint in Second District Court 
and to serve on Wasatch, S52.00 (again, because the Complaint was later filed in Third Diistrict 
Court, Wasatch should not bear this expense). 
e. October 9, 1998, Magna Energy Witness Fee S 17.00, duplicate billing. 
11. I have made no similar redaction for discussion with Mi. Eggett regarding his non-
competition agreement, see Mem. Opp. at 5, because that discussion arose in the context of 
negotiations to settle all claims. I have made no redaction regarding my review of correspondence 
from David Lillywhite, Mem. Opp. at 5, because I reviewed that correspondence in the course of 
determining whether Wasatch's purported termination of Eggett for cause was a pretext to deny him 
book value for his shares. Finally, I have made no redaction for research relating to jury instruction, 
or for responding to discovery requests. Mem. Opp. at 5, because those activies squarely related to 
Eggett's claims for book value for his shares. 
12. The redactions identified in paragraph 10 total S519.00. This reduces Eggett's 
requested costs and fees to $56,381.27. 
Dated this L>* of December, 1999. 
Perriif R. LeSve^  EsqN— 
of December, 1999, Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn under oath, stated 
that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the contents thereof and the same are true to the 
best of his knowledge, except as to those matters stated to be alleged on information and belief, and 
to those matters he believes them to be true. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-000O00-
In re: Judicial Conduct Commission 
Inquiry Concerning a Judge; 
Hon. David S. Young 
F00-3D-037 and 051 
Case No. 20000521-SC 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by 
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution and section 78-
8-107(7) of the Utah Code, the Court approves the implementation 




Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
/ 
f'jBEFORE THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION 
In re: : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
.: OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Inquiry Concerning 
a Judge : F00-3D-037 
F00-3D-051 
___„__ 5ocoo6a\ 
A quorum of the Judicial Conduct Commission, having considered the record in this 
case, enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 17, 1999, at the conclusion of the State v. Shawn L. Martin 
criminal trial, Judge David S. Young criticized the jurors by making the following on-the-record 
comments in the courtroom: 
COURT: I want to tell you [the jurors] that 1 am 
personally disappointed in your verdict in this case and that's all 
I'm going to say about it. I think that this was a pretty clear case. I 
don't know how you came out with this result and this is one of the 
very few times I have criticized a jury for their verdict. Thank you. 
You may be excused. Anything else? 
COUNSEL: No, Your honor. 
2. After the Martin trial, the jurors were escorted to the jury room, where 
Judge Young spoke with the jury and expressed his disagreement with their verdict. 
3. On December 1, 1993, at the conclusion of the State v. Travis A. Johnson 
criminal trial, Judge Young criticized the jurors by making the following on-the-record 
comments in the courtroom: 
1 
I will tell you from my perspective that the jury and the 
jurors in normal circumstances err on the side of compassion. This 
is a case in which they did that. I do not believe the testimony of 
Mr. Johnson. From my perspective I don't know how the jury 
does, but I believe that the circumstances, Mr. Johnson, you were 
not candid in this case and I think you were very fortunate to have 
a not guilty verdict. 
That being the verdict of the jury the court will accept it as 
the decision of the court and the case is dismissed. And you are 
released from any further obligation on these cases. 
And I will suggest to you, Mr. Case, that I believed your 
story and that I believe that the jury was out of line. And that's the 
end of the case. 
4. Canon 3B(10) of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judges from 
commending or criticizing jurors for their verdict other than in a court order or opinion in a 
proceeding. 
5. By the way in which he treated the jurors in the Martin and Johnson cases, 
as described above, Judge Young violated Canon 3B(10) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Judge Young engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which 
brought a judicial office into disrepute, in violation Section 78-7-28(1 )(e) of the Utah Code, 
because he prejudiced public esteem for the judicial office and violated Canon 3B(10) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judges from commending or criticizing jurors for their 
verdict other than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding. 
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ORDER 
Judge Young is publicly reprimanded for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice which brought a judicial office into disrepute, in violation of Section 78-
7-28(1 )(e) of the Utah Code, because he prejudiced public esteem for the judicial office and 
violated Canon 3B(10) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judges from 
commending or criticizing jurors for their verdict other than in a court order or opinion in a 
proceeding. 
DATED this 1 > day of \ A A { , 2000 
THE JUDICIAL C O N D U C T I C O M M I S S I O N 
David Nuffer, Chair 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1M day of JlUOEL, , 2000,1 served a copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER on the Hon. 
David S. Young by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to: 
Hon. David S. Young 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3101 
Steven H. Stewart 
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April 15, 1997 
Board of Directors 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
240 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 699 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Please accept this notice of my resignation as President and Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of Wasatch Energy Corporation and Wasatch Oil & Gas 
Corporation (collectively, the "Company"). 
In accordance with the Employment Agreement (the "Agreement") entered into 
between the Company and myself dated March 31, 1995, I make the following 
assertions: 
1. My employment terminates 90 days after the date of this resignation which is 
July 14, 1997. July 14, 1J)97 will be my date of termination. 
2. I am under no obligation to continue to guarantee the line of credit and will 
immediately notify Barnes Banking Co. of my resignation and of my 
withdrawal of the personal guarantee. 
3. I am under no obligation to continue as a Director or as Chairman of the 
Board of Directors and therefore immediately resign from these positions. 
4. I am restricted from performing certain activities as outlined in paragraph 6 of 
the Agreement for a period of 12 months following the termination of my 
employment. 
In accordance with the Shareholders' Agreement entered into between myself 
and Todd D. Cusick and Curtis R. Chisholm on or about the first week of April 
1995, I am required to sell my shares in the corporation on a pro rata basis to 
Todd D. Cusick and Curtis R. Chisholm for the audited Book Value as of June 
30, 1997. In the event these two individuals do not purchase the stock the « 
Corporation has the right to purchase any remaining shares for the same price. 
Please inform me of the activities I should perform prior to July 14, 1997. 
Sincerely, 
EggetC Jr. 
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